波士顿咨询集团想用钱来阻止我告诉你们的故事 来源
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波士顿咨询集团想用钱来阻止我告诉你们的故事来源:波士顿咨询集团BCG是咨询业界最有名的咨询公司之一。
本文的作者是MIT校报Tech的专栏作者。
作者是MIT原子物理专业毕业的高材生,毕业后就被BCG聘用去迪拜分公司工作,直到不久前迪拜泡沫破裂离职。
作者在校报Tech上写了四篇连载,讲述他的这段经历,向读者介绍了他在迪拜的真实体验和公司的内幕。
选择了他四篇连载中的第三篇,原文标题是同系列四篇文章的链接:1.2.?3.?4.?======================================The story BCG offered me $16,000 not to tellBy?The city was strange and the society was unnerving, but what disturbed me most about my Dubai experience was my job as a business consultant for the Boston Consulting Group.I really had no idea what to expect, going in. In my mind, consulting was abou t answering business questions through analysis. It was supposed to be Excel s heets and models, sifting through data to discover profit and loss, and helpin g clients make decisions that would add the most value for themselves, and by extension, society.It was worrisome to enter a new job without any guarantee that I would be qual ified. I assumed BCG would train me, and that as it had been with MIT, intelli gence and hard work would prove sufficient. Still, I wondered what I would do if for some reason it turned out that I couldn’t get my head around the analy sis? In hindsight, analytical skills should have been the least of my worries.Stretching realityThe first clue t hat my mental picture of consulting was off came with “traini ng” in Munich. I expected instruction in Excel programming, data analysis, an d business theory. Instead, Munich turned out to be little more than a week lo ng social outing with other recently matriculated consultants and analysts wit hin the BCG’s European branches. We donned name tags, shook hands, and drank often. Classes were fluffy, and mostly consisted of discussion of high-level, almost philosophical topics. I got along well — as both an American and a mem ber of the Dubai office, I was doubly foreign and therefore double the curiosi ty.After a pleasant week of pseudo-partying, I returned to Dubai and was assigned to writing case proposals. In the consulting business, it is standard practic e for clients to write requests for proposals, describing the question they wo uld like answered. The consulting firm in turn writes a case proposal: We will answer A by having Consultant B do X, Y, and Z. A well written case proposal promises much, but is deliberately vague about what concrete things the consul tants will produce.Case proposals were despised by the rank and file — one had a dozen bosses, u nclear objectives, and virtually no coordination with co-workers. But in one s ense, the proposals were good practice for real case work. Both involved stret ching reality to fit whatever was assumed the client desired.Despite having no work or research experience outside of MIT, I was regularly advertised to clients as an expert with seemingly years of topical experience relevant to the case. We were so good at rephrasing our credentials that even I was surprised to find in each of my cases, even my very first case, that I w as the most senior consultant on the team.I quickly found out why so little had been invested in developing my Excel-cra ft. Analytical skills were overrated, for the simple reason that clients usual ly didn’t know why they had hired us. They sent us vague requests for proposa l, we returned vague case proposals, and by the time we were hired, no one was the wiser as to why exactly we were there.I got the feeling that our clients were simply trying to mimic successful busi nesses, and that as consultants, our earnings came from having the luck of bei ng included in an elaborate cargo-cult ritual. In any case it fell to us to de cide for ourselves what question we had been hired to answer, and as a matter of convenience, we elected to answer questions that we had already answered in the course of previous cases — no sense in doing new work when old work will do. The toolkit I brought with me from MIT was absolute overkill in this envi ronment. Most of my day was spent thinking up and writing PowerPoint slides. S ometimes, I didn’t even need to write them — we had a service in India that could put together pretty good copy if you provided them with a sketch and som e instructions.Burning outI worked hard at MIT. I routinely took seven to ten classes per semester and f illed whatever hours were left in the day with part-time jobs and tutoring. It was a fairly stupid way of going about my education, and I missed out on many of the learning opportunities that MIT offers outside of classes. I don’t re commend what I did to anyone. But as stupid as carrying double course loads wa s, it had one advantage: After all the long hours I put into MIT, I believed I was invincible. If MIT couldn’t burn me out, nothing else ever could.It took roughly three months before BCG disproved my “burn-out proof” theory. Putting together PowerPoint slides was easy, the hours were lenient, and the fifth day of every week usually consisting of a leisurely day away from the cl ient site. By all accounts, I should have been coasting through my tasks.What I learned is that burning out isn’t just about work load, it’s about wo rk load being greater than the motivation to do work. It was relatively easy t o drag myself to classes when I thought I was working for my own betterment. I t was hard to sit at a laptop and crank out slides when all I seemed to be acc omplishing was the transfer of wealth from my client to my company.I’m a free marketeer. I believe that voluntary exchange is not just a good me thod of incentivizing people to provide their labor and talents to society, bu t a robust moral system — goods and services represent tangible benefit to pe ople, market prices represent the true value of goods in society, and wages re present the value that a worker provides to others. Absent negative externalit ies or monopoly effects, a man receives from the free market what he gives to it, his material worth is a running tally of the net benefit that he has provi ded to his fellow man. A high income is not only justified, but there is nobil ity to it.My moral system is organized around a utilitarian principle of greatest good f or the greatest number — that which adds value cannot be wrong. It did not bo ther me therefore when I was handed consulting reports that had been stolen fr om our competitors. If the information in those reports would help us improve our client, then who could say we were doing wrong? Like downloading MP3s, it was a victimless crime.What I could not get my head around was having to force-fit analysis to a conc lusion. In one case, the question I was tasked with solving had a clear and un ambiguous answer: By my estimate, the client’s plan of action had a net present discounted value of negative one billion dollars. Even after accounting for some degree of error in my reckoning, I could still be sure that theirs was a losing proposition. But the client did not want analysis that contradicted th eir own, and my manager told me plainly that it was not our place to question what the client wanted.In theory, it was their money to lose. If they wanted a consulting report that parroted back their pre-determined conclusion, who was I to complain? I did n ot have any right to dictate that their money be spent differently. And yet, t o not speak out was wrong. To destroy a billion dollars is to destroy an almos t unimaginable amount of human well-being. Spent carefully on anti-malarial be d nets and medicine, one billion dollars could save a million lives. This was a crime, and failing to try and stop it would be as bad as committing it mysel f. And if I could not prevent it, then what reason was I being paid such a hig h salary? How could I justify my income if not by prevailing in situations suc h as these?Sit down, shut upEarly on, before I began case work, one manager I befriended gave me some advi ce. To survive, he told me, I needed to remember The Ratio. 50 percent of the job is nodding your head at whatever is being said. 20 percent is honest work and intelligent thinking. The remaining 30 percent is having the courage to sp eak up, but the wisdom to shut up when you are saying something that your mana ger does not want to hear.I spoke up once. And when it became clear that I would be committing career su icide to press on, I shut up.With a diligent enough effort, one can morally justify nearly anything. It was clear that the client was going to go forward with their decision regardless of how I acted. How could I be responsible for a foregone conclusion? And if I had no power to change things, then why shouldn’t I take the course of actio n that lets me keep my job? Who would it benefit for me to give up my paycheck? With my salary, I could make large and regular contributions to Red Cross or Doctors Without Borders — without it I would just be another unemployed bum. But there is a large difference between telling yourself a story and believing it. Ultimately, the core reason I s tayed silent wasn’t altruistic, but selfi sh. At my salary level, and with my expected advancement path, I could comfort ably retire in my thirties. That would mean nearly a full lifetime at my dispo sal, a solid forty years to find true love and raise a family without distract ion. It was the opportunity to travel, to achieve great things, to self-actual ize. It was the prospect of living a life free of want and need. Who was I kid ding? I wasn’t going to donate half my salary to Red Cross. I was going to de posit it into an index fund and speed off as soon as I was sure there was enou gh gas in the car.The conscience is a pesky thing. It was no consolation that I had gotten the m oral calculus to work out in my favor. I should have been the most relaxed man on the planet, and yet every day I went back to my hotel room and spent most of my time nervously pacing. I couldn’t sleep at night. I’d fill up a bathtub and scream into it. I couldn’t get over the feeling that this was not how I was supposed to spend my life.Staying silent was agonizing. Nominally, my job was to provide advice and aid in my client’s decision-making process. In practice, my job consisted of sitt ing quietly and resisting the urge to dissent. Each day was like a punishment from Greek mythology; with every meeting my liver would grow anew to be eaten again by eagles.I was reminded of the Milgram experiment. I wanted to quit. I didn’t want to have any hand in this, I didn’t want the responsibility of being the destroye r. But the man in the lab coat was telling me that the experiment must continu e. Burnout soon followed.It wasn’t just that I lost all motivation for my job; it was also that it is much harder than one would expect to do unsound analysis. There is an interest ing kabuki dance to be done when crafting figures to fit a conclusion. The con clusion may be wrong, but you still need to make it believable. You still need numbers to fill out your PowerPoint slides, and the numbers need to have enou gh internal consistency not to throw up red flags at a casual glance. Honest a nalysis, even when it has weak areas, is easy to defend. If the numbers look f ishy, there’s an explanation —you didn’t have direct data on such and such and had to use estimates from another report, or made a reasonable assumption somewhere. But when the numbers actually are fishy, and there’s no underlying logic to defend, you can’t have any rough areas for others to poke at. And when you know everything is fishy, you can’t tell what will look fishy to someo ne who hasn’t s een any numbers before.This leads to what I like to call, “Find me a rock” problems. The classic “f ind me a rock” story is as follows: A manager goes to his engineer one day an d asks for a rock. “A rock?” asks the engineer. “Yes, a rock. That isn’t g oing to be a problem, is it?” replies the manager. The engineer laughs and te lls the manager he’ll go pick one up during his lunch break and it will be no problem. After lunch, the manager visits the engineer again and the engineer s hows him the rock. The manager looks at it for a moment before telling the eng ineer, “No, that one won’t work at all. I need a?rock.”“Find me a rock” problems sound dead simple, but in actuality have requireme nts that are poorly stated or unknown. You never know what you’re lookin g for; you only know that you’ll know it when you see it.When you disconnect analysis from reality, it would seem like you are freeing yourself up to do your job any way you like. In actuality, you are exchanging one set of clear objectives and rules for another that is complex and ill-defi ned. At one point my manager said to me, “Change the numbers, but don’t chan ge the conclusion.” Of course, there’s no trouble in changing the numbers —it’s not as if there was much of a basis for this set of numbers ov er another — but change them how, and to what? Who knows? Find me a rock.I don’t know if I’ll ever have kids. Still, when I find myself in a moral qu andary, I like to think it through by imagining how I would explain the situation to my future, hypothetical children. What would I say? How would they reac t? Could I justify my actions as having been in their best interest?I wasn’t sure at the time, but having had enough free time of late to ponder such questions, I think I’ve come to the conclusion that h aving a father who can pay for a top-notch education outweighs the disadvantage of being raised b y a hypocrite. Sticking with the job for the sake of a paycheck passes the chi ldren test.I was not surprised the day I lost my job. The writing was on the wa ll. BCG’s management might have been releasing reports claiming countries like Dubai wou ld be islands of stability in the world’s rough financial seas, but to the gr ound troops, it was obvious the economy was not doing well. From the very begi nning of my e mployment, I hadn’t met a single employee who planned on staying with the company — all of them were scrambling for lifeboats, trying to land cushy jobs with cash-stuffed clients or find their way back to their home coun tries.What did surprise me was the offer BCG made to me as I was on the way out the door. In exchange for me signing an agreement, BCG would give me the rough equ ivalent of $16,000 in UAE dirhams. Much of it looked boilerplate, like any com mon compromise agreement used in Europe — in return for some money, I would s tipulate that I hadn’t been discriminated against on the basis of race or gen der, etc.But the rest was very clearly a non-disclosure agreement, and it made me uncom fortable. I signed a non-disclosure agreement when I first took the job, but t hat only covered BCG’s intellectual property and client identities, things th at seemed entirely reasonable to protect. This agreement went much further. No t only did it bar me from making any disparaging comments about BCG or my work experie nce, but I wouldn’t even be allowed to reveal the existence of the no n-disclosure agreement itself. The implication was clear: I could either be a cheerleader for BCG or stay silent, but anything else would bring swift legal retribution. When I asked to have the non-disclosure clauses removed, I was to ld that the agreement was a standard offer to employees, and that its terms we re non-negotiable.As hard as it was to decide whether or not to stay at my job, it was easy to p ass up the hush money. Mistake or not, my future hypothetical children deserve d to hear their father’s story, and $16,000 did not seem like a lot of money in the grand scheme of things. After rejecting the offer, I enjoyed a full nig ht’s rest.源地址:来源:|分享2269|浏览22746|||••2011-02-21 15:44is this true?!2011-02-21 19:38回复尤东辰:我觉得里面那个20%应该就足以成就BCG了,何况他在的是中东,which我们(至少是我)都不了解那里的商业环境和商业理念。
金钱只认得金钱佛学故事金钱只认得金钱-金钱只认得金钱美国著名的《财富》期刊曾经在封面上登过一位年仅十九岁的年轻人的照片。
他叫约翰逊·斯维斯彭,一位网站拥有者。
他因为在投资家的资助下推出一个名叫“心想事成”的网站而一举成名,在短短数个月内,网页的访问量达到了九百万人次之巨。
这在美国是绝无仅有的,有人惊叹:“难道他是下一个比尔·盖茨吗?”约翰逊在网站上收益了上亿美元的资金,成为美国的一位网络新贵。
他陷入巨大的成功中,认为自己有非凡的能力,也能办到一切事情。
在当时许多人认为这决不是狂言,因为他的年龄和成就甚至超过了当年的比尔·盖茨。
有不少预言家也断定他必然会累积巨大的财富,成为类似于比尔·盖茨那样的影响全球的人物。
不久,美国许多金融机构主动向他提供贷款,给予巨大的财力支持,他的公司很快上市。
财富的累积量像雪球一样越滚越大,从原来的一亿余美元扩增到二十六亿美元。
这简直就是一个财富神话。
他成了媒体、美女追逐的对象,他和世界级的超级模特拍拖约会,和大量的媒体接触,甚至准备拍一部反映他的创业史的电影。
他的生活也极尽奢华,他一共花去了3.24亿美元。
不久,美国股市风云突变,约翰逊公司的股票从原来的每股168美元狂跌到两美元,公司被宣布破产。
仅仅两年后,他变成了一个身无分文的普通人。
那些曾经和他热恋的模特和像苍蝇一样追逐他的电影公司全都不见了。
约翰逊现正在四处筹款准备东山再起,但他发现,原来借钱竟然如此困难。
没有一家公司和金融机构愿意借钱给他,这让人觉得不可思议。
最后,他从他的叔叔那里借到了钱,他又注册了一个网站,但风光不再。
约翰逊说:“经过这些事,我终于明白了,金钱只认得金钱,它不会认得人。
以前我失败的原因是,我总认为金钱是认得我的。
”感悟心得金钱固然能给我们物质上的满足,但我们决不能任意挥霍,藐视人情。
要知道金钱只认得金钱,它不能买来真情,也不是你真正值得炫耀的资本。
人生的路还很漫长,金钱至上的人是无法理解生命的真谛的。
营销哲理的小故事从美国华尔街引发的金融海啸正在演变为全球经济危机。
现在在曼哈顿岛上,几乎所有人都认为中国人有钱,中国人能救全世界。
我从纽约回北京时,临上飞机前,遇到一咖啡厅,进去买几瓶水。
售货的小伙子说:你们是中国人,真好,你们有钱,世界等你们来拯救呢。
我说:这次买水已经花了10元钱了。
我想,他们都认为中国人有钱,是因为他们不了解中国,幻想着中国是世界的大救星。
等我下飞机走出首都机场,在去停车场的电梯上听到了一段对话。
一位做煤炭运输的说,煤炭的运价从130元/吨降到了40元/吨,还没有煤炭可运。
另一位说:去年我们公司赚了240万元,今年差不多亏240万元。
这就是美国人幻想的大救星———中国的市场和经济真实情况。
地球绕着太阳转,月亮绕着地球转,总是质量小的绕着质量大的转。
在经济体上中国是地球,美国就是太阳。
美国出了问题,中国不可能不被波及,更不可能美国绕着中国转,中国还没有这么大的实力。
在国内也是同样的道理,中国的城市是地球的话,中国的农村就是月亮。
城市的经济和市场出了问题不可能靠农村来救,就如同太阳地球不会绕着月亮转一样。
一定不能过分乐观,要把困难想足。
解决困难的办法是什么?几乎全世界的政府都去拿钱救市,每个政府拿出的钱都是天文数字。
但是,从古到今任何政府都不会创造一分钱的社会财富,也不会缴纳一分钱的税。
社会财富和财政、税收的增加都是靠企业、靠劳动者创造的。
政府花的钱从哪里来?只有两条路:一条路是发国债,向别人、别的国家去借。
另一条路是印发钱,现在科技发达了,无纸化都不用印刷了,只要央行行长说发多少就是多少,造成的结果只能是通货膨胀,手中的钱越来越不值钱。
正如巴菲特在前天给《纽约时报》的文章中所说的:“今天,拥有现金是一项可怕的长期资产,没有任何回报且肯定会贬值。
”美国情况如此,中国情况也不例外。
在这种情况,我们的出路是什么?要面向中国市场,不要再把市场定位在为世界500强服务,为世界超级品牌服务。
10位历史名人的理财小故事,听过3个算你厉害爱因斯坦、马克思、牛顿、丘吉尔、卓别林、猫王ElvisPresley、肯德基创始人桑德斯上校、胡适、鲁迅、马克·吐温,这些历史名人很多人一定听说过。
可是,关于他们的理财故事,99%的人应该都不知道吧,下面随小编一起看看关于他们的理财故事吧。
1、爱因斯坦爱因斯坦说:“金钱只能用于满足私欲,并且常常被其拥有者滥用。
”所以他曾在普林斯顿大学要求$3000元的超低价薪水——后被校方以“太低”为由拒绝,在财务顾问劝说下,才终以$17000元妥协。
然而,如果你认为爱因斯坦是个天生的穷光蛋,那就大错特错了。
在不到20年的时间里,他让几千美元的股票升值到25万美元。
虽然他自己并不擅长理财,但是他很懂人,雇了一个理财顾问打理家里的财富,这也是他取得如此优异成绩的原因。
2、马克思1864年,马克思当时正在伦敦做研究工作,经济一直比较拮据。
有一次,他的朋友遗赠给他600英镑。
对经济学非常了解的马克思决定用它来投资股票,最后净赚400英镑左右。
看来,比起马克思伟大的思想,他的炒股规模却小得多。
即使如此,马克思的股票操作也非常谨慎。
他瞄准英国刚颁布《股份公司法》、股份公司开始飞速发展的时机,分批次购买了一些英国股票,之后他耐心等待市场变化,股格上升一段时间后就迅速地逐一清仓。
3、牛顿牛顿的一生是极“牛”的,他是近代经典力学的开山祖师,也曾任英格兰皇家造币厂厂长。
不过,他平生唯一一次炒股,却如同经历了2015年中国股灾一般……1720年4月,牛顿投入约7000英镑购买了英国南海公司的股票,仅两个月就股价翻番,随后卖出。
但到了7月,股票又继续增值了8倍,这让牛顿悔不当初——“恍然大悟”后,牛顿大概就开始变笨了,他随之决定加大投入,最终巨亏2万英镑——这相当于他当造币厂厂长十年薪水!4、丘吉尔1929年,刚刚卸任英国财政大臣的丘吉尔和几个同伴来到美国,受到投机大师巴鲁克的热情接待。
波士顿矩阵小故事
波士顿矩阵,又称BCG矩阵,是由美国波士顿咨询公司(Boston Consulting Group,简称BCG)在20世纪60年代开发的一种商业策略工具。
这个矩阵帮助企业分析其业务组合,确定哪些业务应该扩大、哪些应该缩减,以及哪些应该维持现状。
以下是关于波士顿矩阵的小故事:
在一个小镇上,有一家叫做“波士顿糖果屋”的糖果店。
这家店的糖果种类非常多,从普通的巧克力到各种奇特的口味都有。
由于市场竞争激烈,店主不知道应该如何管理这些糖果,以最大化利润。
有一天,一个咨询顾问来到了这家店,他向店主介绍了波士顿矩阵的概念。
这个矩阵将糖果分为四个象限:
1. 明星产品:高市场份额、高增长率的产品,如某些独特的巧克力口味。
2. 现金牛产品:高市场份额、低增长率的传统糖果,如经典的巧克力棒。
3. 问题产品:低市场份额、高增长率的创新糖果,如一些新奇的口味。
4. 瘦狗产品:低市场份额、低增长率的滞销糖果。
店主听完之后,恍然大悟。
他意识到他的糖果店有很多现金牛产品,这些产品虽然销量稳定,但缺乏增长潜力。
同时,他也发现
有一些问题产品,这些产品虽然有增长潜力,但市场份额较低。
于是,店主决定采取行动。
他开始将更多的资源投入到问题产品的推广上,以提高其市场份额。
同时,他也开始寻找新的机会,开发新的明星产品。
几个月后,波士顿糖果屋的业绩开始回升。
店主非常高兴,他感谢了咨询顾问的帮助,并决定继续使用波士顿矩阵来管理他的业务。
公关世界078人生·职场高参美国有线新闻网络脱口秀著名的节目主持人卡尔森,对朋友诚信、对合作伙伴诚信、对企业诚信、对领导诚信、对国家诚信的人,不论到哪儿,都是最受欢迎的人。
塑造诚信品牌要做到两点:诚实和正直。
诚实是一种美德,对别人诚实才能获得别人的信任和尊敬。
几乎所有的企业都把诚实作为评价员工的重要标准、作为原则。
坎贝斯是美国波音航空公司的董事长。
他10岁时曾到一家偏僻的糖果店干活。
一次扫地时,他看见地上有15美分,便捡起来交给店主。
店主拍拍他的肩膀说,我是有意把钱扔到那儿的,目的是要试试你是否诚实。
坎贝斯因为诚实获得了老板的信任,整个高中阶段老板都留他在店里干活。
诚实让他保住了当时非常难找的工作,诚实也成就了他后来的事业。
一个人如果失去了诚实,将会失去朋友、失去客户、失去工作,因为谁也不愿意与不诚实的人打交道,纵使他才华横溢。
小林和小康是速递公司的同事,他俩同时进公司,业绩不相上下。
然而,有一件事改变了他们的命运。
一次,小林和小康负责把一件贵重的古董送到码头,领导反复叮嘱他们路上要小心。
没想到,送货车半路坏了。
于是小林凭着自己力气大,背起古董一路小跑,在规定的时间赶到了码头。
这时小康说:“我来拿吧,你去叫货主。
”他心里暗想,客户看到我拿着古董,告诉领导,领导说不定会给我加薪呢!他只顾想,当小林把古董递给他时他没接住,古董掉到地上摔碎了。
“你怎么搞的,我没接呢你就放手?!”小康大喊。
“你明明伸出手了,是你没接住。
”小林辩解道。
他们都知道古董打碎意味着什么,没了工作不说,可能还得赔偿。
果然,领导严厉地批评了他俩。
“经理,不是我的错,是小林不小心弄坏了。
”小康趁小林不注意,偷偷来到领导的办公室。
领导平静地说:“谢谢你,我知道了。
” 领导把小林叫到办公室。
小林把事情的前前后后如实向领导汇报,最后说:“这件事是我们的失职,我愿意承担责任。
小康的经济条件不好,他的责任我愿意承担,我一定会弥补造成的损失。
直销励志小故事大道理美国,华尔街,某大银行。
一位提着豪华公文包的犹太老人,来到贷款部前,大模大样地坐了下来。
“请问先生,您有什么事情需要我们效劳吗?”贷款部经理一边小心地询问,一边打量着来人的穿着:名贵的西服,高档的皮鞋,昂贵的手表,还有镶着宝石的领带夹子``````“我想借点钱。
”“完全可以,您想借多少呢?”“1美元。
”“只借1美元?”贷款部的经理惊愕了。
“我只需要1美元。
可以吗?”“当然,只要有担保,借多少我们都可以照办。
”“好吧。
”犹太人从豪华公文包里取出一大堆股票、国债、债券等放在桌上:“这些做担保可以吗?”贷款部经理清点了一下,“先生,总共50万美元,做担保足够了,不过先生,您真的只借1美元吗?”“是的。
”犹太老人面无表情地说。
“好吧,到那边办手续吧,年息为6%,只要您付6%的利息,一年后归还,我们就把这些作保的股票和证卷还给您``````”“谢谢``````”犹太富豪办完手续,准备离去。
一直在一边冷眼旁观的银行行长怎么也弄不明白,一个拥有50万美元的富豪,怎么会跑到银行来借1美元呢?他从后面追了上去,有些窘迫地说:“对不起,先生,可以问您一个问题吗?”“你想问什么?”“我是这家银行的行长,我实在弄不懂,您拥有50万美元的家当,为什么只借1美元呢?要是您想借40万美元的话,我们也会很乐意为您服务的``````”“好吧,既然你如此热情,我不妨把实情告诉你。
我到这儿来,是想办一件事情,可是随身携带的这些票卷很碍事,我问过几家金库,要租他们的保险箱,租金都很昂贵,我知道银行的保安很好,所以嘛,就将这些东西以担保的形式寄存在贵行了,由你们替我保管,我还有什么不放心呢!况且利息很便宜,存一年才不过6美分``````”直销励志小故事(二)查理是英国一家农机制造公司的推销员。
一天,他前往曼彻斯特的一座农场推销公司生产的收割机。
到了农场,他看见一个皮脸黝黑的老人正在那儿割草。
查理走上前去,说明了自己的来意。
There’s no Free Lunch. If it’s too good to be true, it’s not true at all. (天下没有免费的午餐。
如果这听起来美好得不像是真的,那就决不是真的。
)——美国人常挂在嘴上的话。
People never change,and never learn. (人性千年不变,并且从不吸取教训。
)——黑格尔这次金融危机之中,华尔街传出匪夷所思的惊天诈骗大案,诈骗金额高达500亿美元,受骗者竟然是全球知名银行和经过大风浪的人中菁英,12月23日法国贵族、20亿欧元的通路国际(Access International)老总德拉维耶伊谢(Thierry de la Villehuchet)因15亿欧元深陷其中,在纽约办公室自杀,后续的灾难还不可测。
这个骗局的始作俑者——前那斯达克主席马多夫(Bernard Madoff)为何可以明目张胆、运作如此庞大的骗局长达20多年?华尔街的金字塔骗局文/陈思进黑格尔说:“人性千年不变,并且从不吸取教训。
”对这句话,我不敢完全苟同。
人类不是不断地在自我完善和追求进步吗?不过,在对待金钱方面,黑老这句话倒似乎是千真万确的!上世纪20年代,位于美国东北部的新英格兰地区,一个叫Charles Ponzi(查尔斯庞氏)的人,有一天忽然宣布:“我找到了发大财的秘诀,已经是百万富翁了。
我们都信仰上帝,非但不能独享财富,而且还要帮大家一起富起来。
谁将钱存在我那儿,我担保每个月给予比银行利息高得多的回报。
”人们询问他是怎么做到的。
他神秘地告诉大家:“这与美元和外币兑换有关,可具体怎么做很复杂,你们也听不懂。
信我就是了。
”一开始没人信他,不过经不起他的忽悠,有几个人拿出一百、二百试一下,权当是小赌怡情。
没想到庞氏真守信用,每个月都按时按量付出利息。
好事自然不胫而走,由于前期投资的人回报丰厚,庞氏成功地在七个月内吸引了三万名投资者,越来越多的人投钱给他,越来越多的人尝到了甜头。
巴菲特经典的演讲破产有两种人一种什么都不知道一种什么都知道巴菲特:破产的往往只有2种人,一种是什么都不知道的,一种是什么都知道的。
什么都不知道的人在市场不知道干什么。
什么都知道的人在市场会乱搞一通。
假如给我一把手枪,里面有一千个弹夹,一颗子弹,给脑袋开一枪,赢了给我一千万,我不会干,给再多我都不会干。
股票市场上玩这个俄罗斯轮盘游戏的太多了。
这个游戏很刺激,也很迷人。
长期下来,他们甚至忘记手枪里的子弹了,最后当成没子弹来玩。
他们的命运一开始就注定了。
会计算西格玛,不代表你就知道破产的风险。
我是这么想的,不知道现在他们是不是也这么想了。
说真的,我都不愿意以长期资本为例。
我们都有一定的概率会摊上类似的事,我们都有盲点,或许是因为我们了解了太多的细枝末节,把最关键的地方忽略了。
亨利考夫曼说过一句话:“破产的有两种人,一种是什么都不知道的,一种是什么都知道的。
”说起来,真是令人扼腕叹息。
同学们,引以为戒。
我们基本上没借过钱,当然我们的保险公司里有浮存金。
但是我压根没借过钱。
我只有 1 万块钱的时候都不借钱,不借钱不一样吗?我钱少的时候做投资也很开心。
我根本不在乎我到底是有 1 万、10 万,还是 100 万。
除非遇上了急事,比如生了大病急需用钱。
当年我钱很少,但我也没盼着以后钱多了要过不一样的生活。
从衣食住行来看,你我之间有什么差别吗?我们穿一样的衣服,我们都能喝天赐的可口可乐,我们都能吃上麦当劳,还有更美味的 DQ 冰淇淋,我们都住在冬暖夏凉的房子里,我们都在大屏幕上看橄榄球赛。
你在大电视上看,我也在大电视上看。
我们的生活完全一样,没多大差别。
要是你生了大病,会得到良好的治疗。
如果我得了大病,也会得到良好的治疗。
我们唯一不一样的地方是我们出行的方式不同。
我有一架小飞机,可以飞来飞去,我特别喜欢这架飞机,这是要花钱的。
除了我们出行的方式不同,你说有什么是我能做,但你做不了的吗?我有一份我热爱的工作,但我一直都在做我喜欢的工作。
四个小故事与庞氏骗局讲四个很古老的骗局故事,以及真实的“庞氏骗局”来历。
01、猴子的故事有一个商人到了一个山村,村子周围的山上全是猴子。
商人就和村子种地的农民说,我买猴子,100元一只。
村民不知是真是假,试着抓猴子,商人果然给了100元。
于是全村的人都去抓猴子,这比种地合算得多了。
很快商人买了两千多只猴子,山上猴子很少了。
商人这时又出价200元一只买猴子,村民见猴价翻番,便又纷纷去抓,商人又买了,但猴子已经很难抓到了。
商人又出价300元一只买猴子,猴子几乎抓不到了。
商人出价到500元一只,山上已没有猴子,三千多只猴子都在商人这里。
这天,商人有事回城里,他的助手到村里和农民们说,我把猴子300元一只卖你们,等商人回来,你们500元卖给商人,你们就发财了。
村民疯了一般,把锅砸了卖铁,凑够钱,把三千多只猴子全买了回去。
助手带着钱走了,商人再也没有回来。
村民等了很久很久,他们坚信商人会回来500元买他们的猴子,终于有人等不急了,猴子还要吃香蕉,这有费用啊,把猴子放回了山上,山上仍然到处是猴子。
02、烧饼的故事有两个人在卖烧饼,有且只有两个人,姑且称他们为烧饼甲、烧饼乙。
假设他们的烧饼价格没有物价局监管;假设他们每个烧饼卖一元钱就可以保本(包括他们的劳动力价值);假设他们的烧饼数量一样多。
——经济模型都这样,假设需要很多。
再假设他们生意很不好,一个买烧饼的人都没有。
这样他们很无聊地站了半天。
甲说好无聊。
乙也说好无聊,反正闲着也是闲着,不如我们玩个游戏?甲赞成。
于是,故事开始了:甲花一元钱买乙一个烧饼,乙也花一元钱买甲一个烧饼,现金交付。
甲再花两元钱买乙一个烧饼,乙也花两元钱买甲一个烧饼,现金交付。
甲再花三元钱买乙一个烧饼,乙也花三元钱买甲一个烧饼,现金交付。
就这样倒来倒去,不一会儿就涨到了每个烧饼10元。
但甲和乙手上的烧饼数还是一样,实际谁都没有赚钱,谁也没有亏钱。
两个人玩得正嗨的时候,路人丙来了,一个小时前路过的时候知道烧饼是一元一个,现在发现是10元一个,他很惊讶。
【名人故事】华尔街大亨1861年10月7日,在美国纽约一幢豪华邸宅里,正在举行一个与众不同的婚礼。
尽管每个人从心底对新郎新娘怀着无尽的祝福,但现场仍笼罩着静寂、哀伤的气氛,婚礼犹如葬礼。
这邸宅是新娘的娘家。
新娘的父母参加了婚礼,但新郎的双亲却呆在伦敦家里没有来。
新郎的父母未参加婚礼虽非极力反对这一婚事,但不可否认,他们也不很赞同。
他们惊讶的是,他们的儿子会如此坚决地对待这桩婚事。
婚礼是在屏风后祭坛前一张床前举行的,首先由牧师作了简短祈祷,随后新郎新娘宣誓永远相爱,并交换了戒指,互相拥抱、接吻。
整个过程用不了10分钟,然而头戴面纱、身穿雪白长礼服的新娘已面白如纸,支持不住了,需要新郎搀扶着她。
新郎名叫皮柏,他的全名是约翰·皮尔庞特·摩根。
新娘名叫咪咪。
新娘的母亲带着哭腔说:“皮柏,你一定要救救可怜的咪咪啊!”新郎说:“您放心,我一定会竭尽全力医好咪咪的病!”婚礼过后,皮柏就带上咪咪乘轮船,去阿尔及尔治病去了。
在轮船的包舱里,皮柏深情地望着妻子。
她的身体如此单薄,以致会让人想起“红颜薄命”这个词来。
皮柏是在四年前和咪咪认识的。
当时,皮柏在完成大学的学业后,决定到父亲朋友在美国纽约华尔街开设的邓肯商行去实习两年。
此前他到邓肯的别墅去度假,就在那儿,他认识了端庄妩媚、多才多艺的咪咪。
咪咪的全名叫亚美莉亚·斯塔杰。
有一次,皮柏的母亲从伦敦来纽约,皮柏就让母亲带咪咪去欧洲观光。
在伦敦,皮柏的父亲见到了咪咪,得知他们的恋情,应允了这门婚事。
当时,咪咪还没患病。
皮柏在邓肯商行干了一段时间。
在他母亲和咪咪搭船去伦敦之际,他去古巴的哈瓦那,采购了鱼、虾、贝类及砂糖等货物。
在返回的途中,他小试了自己的冒险精神。
当时,轮船停泊在新奥尔良,他信步走过充满巴黎浪漫气息的法国街,来到了嘈杂的码头。
码头上,晌午的太阳烤得正热。
远处两艘从密西西比河下来的轮船停泊着,黑人正在忙碌着上货、卸货。
一位陌生白人拍了拍他的肩膀,问道:“小伙子,想买咖啡吗?”那人自我介绍说,他是往来美国和巴西的货船船长,受托到巴西的咖啡商那里运来一船咖啡。
门口的野蛮人启示《门口的野蛮人》由“华尔街日报”前记者布赖恩·伯勒/约翰·希利亚尔著,所讲述的是1988年-1989年一桩轰动全美的收购案,涉及资金达到250亿美金,不但打破当时最高纪录,而且在其后十多年一直未被超越。
谓“野蛮收购”又称敌意收购(hostile takeover),是指收购公司在未经目标公司董事会的允许,在不管对方是否同意的情况下,所进行的收购活动,具体的操作方法,就是在证券交易所收购上市公司的股票。
《门口的野蛮人》再现了华尔街历史上最著名的公司争夺战——对美国RJR纳贝斯克公司的争夺战。
四个竞标方参与了竞争,KKR公司最终以250亿美元取得胜利,获得了RJR 纳贝斯克公司的控制权。
提供了最高水平公司金融操作的具体细节,全面展示了企业的管理者如何取得和掌握公司的控制权,是一部精彩的华尔街商战纪实巨著,是每一个公司管理者和对华尔街金融感兴趣的专业人士的必读之书。
深度接触资本世界,金融大鳄、国际巨头悉数登场——KKR、DBL、美林、高盛、雷曼、拉札德、所罗门兄弟、第一波士顿、贝尔斯登、大通曼哈顿、花旗、摩根士丹利、巴菲特、米尔肯、纳贝斯克、菲利普·莫里斯、美国运通、百事可乐、宝洁、卡夫、麦肯锡……有史以来最推荐的商界与金融界实战经典案例!对于那些不怀好意的收购者,华尔街通常称之为“门口的野蛮人”。
两位《华尔街日报》的记者凭借人脉和技巧,令当事人吐露真言,获取了第一手的资料,再辅以引人入胜的妙笔,曝露出当时华尔街最大的收购——1988年KKR公司收购雷诺兹-纳贝斯克的来龙去脉,以及华尔街金融操作的风风雨雨。
书的前半部交待出主角们的发家史,俨然是美国经济浮世绘;后半部情节紧张,宛如悬疑小说。
其间,人物们尔虞我诈,故事充满金融交易、舆论压力、决策博弈、社交晚宴和董事会议,不仅让读者见识到如此重大的收购在高层之间是如何运作的,也让我们看到一部充满洞见的金融社会史。
波士顿咨询集团想用钱来阻止我告诉你们的故事来源:波士顿咨询集团BCG是咨询业界最有名的咨询公司之一。
本文的作者是MIT校报Tech的专栏作者。
作者是MIT原子物理专业毕业的高材生,毕业后就被BCG聘用去迪拜分公司工作,直到不久前迪拜泡沫破裂离职。
作者在校报Tech上写了四篇连载,讲述他的这段经历,向读者介绍了他在迪拜的真实体验和公司的内幕。
选择了他四篇连载中的第三篇,原文标题是同系列四篇文章的链接:1.2.3.4.======================================The story BCG offered me $16,000 not to tellByT he city was strange and the society was unnerving, but what distur bed me most about my Dubai experience was my job as a business consultant for the Boston Consulting Group.I really had no idea what to expect, going in. In my mind, consulting was about answering business questions through analysis. It was su pposed to be Excel sheets and models, sifting through data to discov er profit and loss, and helping clients make decisions that would add the most value for themselves, and by extension, society.It was worrisome to enter a new job without any guarantee that I w ould be qualified. I assumed BCG would train me, and that as it had been with MIT, intelligence and hard work would prove sufficient. Sti ll, I wondered what I would do if for some reason it turned out that I couldn’t get my head around the analysis In hindsight, analytical s kills should have been the least of my worries.Stretching realityThe first clue that my mental picture of consulting was off came with “training” in Munich. I expected instruction in Excel programming, da ta analysis, and business theory. Instead, Munich turned out to be litt le more than a week long social outing with other recently matriculat ed consultants and analysts within the BCG’s European branches. We donned name tags, shook hands, and drank often. Classes were fluffy, and mostly consisted of discussion of high-level, almost philosophical topics. I got along well —as both an American and a member of the Dubai office, I was doubly foreign and therefore double the curios ity.After a pleasant week of pseudo-partying, I returned to Dubai and w as assigned to writing case proposals. In the consulting business, it is standard practice for clients to write requests for proposals, describin g the question they would like answered. The consulting firm in turn writes a case proposal: We will answer A by having Consultant B do X, Y, and Z. A well written case proposal promises much, but is delib erately vague about what concrete things the consultants will produce.Case proposals were despised by the rank and file —one had a doz en bosses, unclear objectives, and virtually no coordination with co-w orkers. But in one sense, the proposals were good practice for real c ase work. Both involved stretching reality to fit whatever was assume d the client desired.Despite having no work or research experience outside of MIT, I was regularly advertised to clients as an expert with seemingly years of t opical experience relevant to the case. We were so good at rephrasin g our credentials that even I was surprised to find in each of my cas es, even my very first case, that I was the most senior consultant on the team.I quickly found out why so little had been invested in developing my Excel-craft. Analytical skills were overrated, for the simple reason tha t clients usually didn’t know why they had hired us. They sent us va gue requests for proposal, we returned vague case proposals, and by the time we were hired, no one was the wiser as to why exactly w e were there.I got the feeling that our clients were simply trying to mimic successf ul businesses, and that as consultants, our earnings came from havin g the luck of being included in an elaborate cargo-cult ritual. In any case it fell to us to decide for ourselves what question we had been hired to answer, and as a matter of convenience, we elected to answ er questions that we had already answered in the course of previous cases —no sense in doing new work when old work will do. The t oolkit I brought with me from MIT was absolute overkill in this envir onment. Most of my day was spent thinking up and writing PowerPoi nt slides. Sometimes, I didn’t even need to write them —we had a service in India that could put together pretty good copy if you provi ded them with a sketch and some instructions.Burning outI worked hard at MIT. I routinely took seven to ten classes per sem ester and filled whatever hours were left in the day with part-time jobs and tutoring. It was a fairly stupid way of going about my educati on, and I missed out on many of the learning opportunities that MIT offers outside of classes. I don’t recommend what I did to anyone. But as stupid as carrying double course loads was, it had one advant age: After all the long hours I put into MIT, I believed I was invincib le. If MIT couldn’t burn me out, nothing else ever could.It took roughly three months before BCG disproved my “burn-out pro of” theory. Putting together PowerPoint slides was easy, the hours we re lenient, and the fifth day of every week usually consisting of a lei surely day away from the client site. By all accounts, I should have been coasting through my tasks.What I learned is that burning out isn’t just about work load, it’s abo ut work load being greater than the motivation to do work. It was re latively easy to drag myself to classes when I thought I was working for my own betterment. It was hard to sit at a laptop and crank ou t slides when all I seemed to be accomplishing was the transfer of w ealth from my client to my company.I’m a free marketeer. I believe that voluntary exchange is not just a good method of incentivizing people to provide their labor and talents to society, but a robust moral system —goods and services represe nt tangible benefit to people, market prices represent the true valueof goods in society, and wages represent the value that a worker pro vides to others. Absent negative externalities or monopoly effects, a man receives from the free market what he gives to it, his material worth is a running tally of the net benefit that he has provided to hi s fellow man. A high income is not only justified, but there is nobility to it.My moral system is organized around a utilitarian principle of greatest good for the greatest number —that which adds value cannot be w rong. It did not bother me therefore when I was handed consulting r eports that had been stolen from our competitors. If the information in those reports would help us improve our client, then who could sa y we were doing wrong Like downloading MP3s, it was a victimless c rime.What I could not get my head around was having to force-fit analysi s to a conclusion. In one case, the question I was tasked with solvin g had a clear and unambiguous answer: By my estimate, t he client’s plan of action had a net present discounted value of negative one bil lion dollars. Even after accounting for some degree of error in my re ckoning, I could still be sure that theirs was a losing proposition. But the client did not want analysis that contradicted their own, and my manager told me plainly that it was not our place to question what the client wanted.In theory, it was their money to lose. If they wanted a consulting re port that parroted back their pre-determined conclusion, who was I t o complain I did not have any right to dictate that their money be s pent differently. And yet, to not speak out was wrong. To destroy a billion dollars is to destroy an almost unimaginable amount of human well-being. Spent carefully on anti-malarial bed nets and medicine, o ne billion dollars could save a million lives. This was a crime, and fail ing to try and stop it would be as bad as committing it myself. And if I could not prevent it, then what reason was I being paid such a high salary How could I justify my income if not by prevailing in situ ations such as theseSit down, shut upEarly on, before I began case work, one manager I befriended gave me some advice. To survive, he told me, I needed to remember The Ratio. 50 percent of the job is nodding your head at whatever is be ing said. 20 percent is honest work and intelligent thinking. The rema ining 30 percent is having the courage to speak up, but the wisdom to shut up when you are saying something that your manager does not want to hear.I spoke up once. And when it became clear that I would be committi ng career suicide to press on, I shut up.With a diligent enough effort, one can morally justify nearly anything. It was clear that the client was going to go forward with their decis ion regardless of how I acted. How could I be responsible for a fore gone conclusion And if I had no power to change things, then why s houldn’t I take the course of action that lets me keep my job Who would it benefit for me to give up my paycheck With my salary, I co uld make large and regular contributions to Red Cross or Doctors Wit hout Borders —without it I would just be another unemployed bum.But there is a large difference between telling yourself a story and b elieving it. Ultimately, the core reason I stayed sile nt wasn’t altruistic, but selfish. At my salary level, and with my expected advancement path, I could comfortably retire in my thirties. That would mean nearl y a full lifetime at my disposal, a solid forty years to find true love a nd raise a family without distraction. It was the opportunity to travel, to achieve great things, to self-actualize. It was the prospect of livin g a life free of want and need. Who was I kidding I wasn’t going to donate half my salary to Red Cross. I was going to deposit it into a n index fund and speed off as soon as I was sure there was enough gas in the car.The conscience is a pesky thing. It was no consolation that I had go tten the moral calculus to work out in my favor. I should have beenthe most relaxed man on the planet, and yet every day I went back to my hotel room and spent most of my time nervously pacing. I c ouldn’t sleep at night. I’d fill up a bathtub and scream into it. I coul dn’t get over the feeling that this was not how I was supposed to s pend my life.Staying silent was agonizing. Nominally, my job was to provide advice and aid in my client’s decision-making process. In practice, my job c onsisted of sitting quietly and resisting the urge to dissent. Each day was like a punishment from Greek mythology; with every meeting my liver would grow anew to be eaten again by eagles.I was reminded of the Milgram experiment. I wanted to quit. I didn’t want to have any hand in this, I didn’t want the responsibility of be ing the destroyer. But the man in the lab coat was telling me that th e experiment must continue. Burnout soon followed.It wasn’t just that I lost all motivation for my job; it was also that it is much harder than one would expect to do unsound analysis. Ther e is an interesting kabuki dance to be done when crafting figures to fit a conclusion. The conclusion may be wrong, but you still need to make it believable. You still need numbers to fill out your PowerPoint slides, and the numbers need to have enough internal consistency n ot to throw up red flags at a casual glance. Honest analysis, even when it has weak areas, is easy to defend. If the numbers look fishy, there’s an explanation —you didn’t have direct data on such and suc h and had to use estimates from another report, or made a reasonab le assumption somewhere. But when the numbers actually are fishy, and there’s no underlying logic to defend, you can’t have any rough areas for others to poke at. And when you know everything is fishy, you can’t tell what will look fishy to someone who hasn’t seen any n umbers before.This leads to what I like to call, “Find me a rock” problems. The clas sic “find me a rock” story is as follows: A manager goes to his engin eer one day and asks for a rock. “A rock” asks the engineer. “Yes, a rock. That isn’t going to be a problem, is it” replies the manager. T he engineer laughs and tells the manager he’ll go pick one up during his lunch break and it will be no problem. After lunch, the manager visits the engineer again and the engineer shows him the rock. The manager looks at it for a moment before telling the engineer, “No, t hat one won’t work at all. I need a rock.”“Find me a rock” problems sound dead simple, but in actuality have r equirements that are poorly stated or unknown. You never know wha t you’re looking for; you only know that you’ll know it when you see it.When you disconnect analysis from reality, it would seem like you ar e freeing yourself up to do your job any way you like. In actuality, y ou are exchanging one set of clear objectives and rules for another t hat is complex and ill-defined. At one point my manager said to me, “Change the numbers, but don’t change the conclusion.” Of course, t here’s no trouble in changing the numbers —it’s not as if there was much of a basis for this set of numbers over another —but change them how, and to what Who knows Find me a rock.I don’t know if I’ll ever have kids. Still, when I find myself in a mora l quandary, I like to think it through by imagining how I would expla in the situation to my future, hypothetical children. What would I say How would they react Could I justify my actions as having been in their best interestI wasn’t sure at the time, but having had enough free time of late t o ponder such questions, I think I’ve come to the conclusion that ha ving a father who can pay for a top-notch education outweighs the d isadvantage of being raised by a hypocrite. Sticking with the job for t he sake of a paycheck passes the children test.I was not surprised the day I lost my job. The writing was on the w all. BCG’s managemen t might have been releasing reports claiming co untries like Dubai would be islands of stability in the world’s rough financial seas, but to the ground troops, it was obvious the economy was not doing well. From the very beginning of my employment, I h adn’t met a single employee who planned on staying with the compa ny —all of them were scrambling for lifeboats, trying to land cushy j obs with cash-stuffed clients or find their way back to their home co untries.What did surprise me was the offer BCG made to me as I was on th e way out the door. In exchange for me signing an agreement, BCG would give me the rough equivalent of $16,000 in UAE dirhams. Muc h of it looked boilerplate, like any common compromise agreement us ed in Europe —in return for some money, I would stipulate that I h adn’t been discriminated against on the basis of race or gender, etc. But the rest was very clearly a non-disclosure agreement, and it mad e me uncomfortable. I signed a non-disclosure agreement when I firs t took the job, but that only covered BCG’s intellectual property and client identities, things that seemed entirely reasonable to protect. Thi s agreement went much further. Not only did it bar me from making any disparaging comments about BCG or my work experience, but I wouldn’t even be allowed to reveal the existence of the non-disclosu re agreement itself. The implication was clear: I could either be a ch eerleader for BCG or stay silent, but anything else would bring swift l egal retribution. When I asked to have the non-disclosure clauses removed, I was told that the agreement was a standard offer to emplo yees, and that its terms were non-negotiable.As hard as it was to decide whether or not to stay at my job, it was easy to pass up the hush money. Mistake or not, my future hypothe tical children deserved to hear their father’s story, and $16,000 did n ot seem like a lot of money in the grand scheme of things. After rej ecting the offer, I enjoyed a full night’s rest.源地址:来源:|分享2269|浏览22746|||••2011-02-21 15:44is this true!2011-02-21 19:38回复尤东辰:我觉得里面那个20%应该就足以成就BCG了,何况他在的是中东,which我们(至少是我)都不了解那里的商业环境和商业理念。