Tying in two-sided markets and the honor all cards rule

营销英语词汇大全1vertical marketing systems (VMS) 垂直营销系统vision 愿景Volvo 沃尔沃W Wall Street Journal 《华尔街日报》Wal-Mart 沃尔玛Walt Disney 迪斯尼want 欲求warranty 质量保证weight 加权Wella 维拉Wendys 温迪Whirlpool 惠而浦wholesale clubs 批发俱乐部wholesaler-sponsored voluntary chains 批发商发起的自愿连锁wholesaling trends 批发趋势win-back program 赢回(顾客)方案working capital investment 周转资金投入workload approach 计算工作量方法World Wide Web (WWW) 万维网X Xerox 施乐Y Yamaha 雅马哈young urban trend setters 年轻的城市潮流领导Z zero defect 零缺陷zone pricing 分区定价法营销英语词汇大全2 threat of new entrants 新进入者的威胁three order-hierarchy models 三阶段层级结构模型Tide 汰渍Tiffany 达芙妮Time 《时代周刊》time frame 时间框架/要求time pricing 时间定价time utility 时间效用Timex 天美时title 所有权Toshiba 东芝total cost 总成本total quality managemnt (TQM) 全面质量管理tough customer 苛刻的顾客Toyota Motor Corporation 丰田Toys R Us 美国着名玩具零售商tracking and monitoring 跟踪与监控trade mark 商标trade promotion 贸易促销trade selling 贸易销售trade/functional discounts 贸易/职能折扣trade-in allowance 以旧换新折让trading companies 贸易公司traditional stores 传统商店training 培训transactiional efficiency 交易效率transaction cost analysis (TCA) 交易成本分析transportation 运输trends 趋势turnkey construction contract 监督建筑契约turnover 人员流动two-sided presentations 双向信息陈述tying contracts 附带条件的合同Tylenol 泰诺营销英语词汇大全3 survival pricing 生存定价法sustainable competitive advantage 可持续的竞争优势sweepstakes 彩票抽奖switching cost 转换成本symbols 符号synergy 协同作用T tabulation 制表Taco Bell 塔可钟tangibility 有形性Tantem Computerstarget audience 目标受众target level of product quality 产品质量标准target or hurdle level 目标或难度水平target return price 目标回报价格targeting strategy 目标市场选择战略targeting 目标市场选择taste 口味/喜好team selling 团队销售technical selling 技术销售telecommunications industry 电讯产业telemarketing 电话销售television audience measurement 电视观众测量television home shopping 电视家庭购物territorial restrictions 地区限制territories 区域territory design and deployment 区域设计及部署territory inventory 地区存货test marketing 市场测试testing new product 测试新产品the American Association for Public Opinion Research 美国公共意见研究协会the Council of American Survey Research Organization 美国调查研究组织委员会the Fishbein Model 菲什宾模型the Marketing Research Association 营销研究协会theatre tests 现场测试营销英语词汇大全4statement of job qualifications 工作要求说明stock levels 库存水平stockless purchase arrangement 无存货采购计划store brands 零售商品牌straight commission compensation plan 纯佣金制薪酬方案straight rebuy 直接再购straight salary compensation plan 纯薪金制薪酬方案strategic alliances 战略联盟strategic business unit (SBU) 战略经营/业务单位strategic control 战略控制strategic fit 战略协调性strategic group 战略组strategic inertia 战略惯性strategic intent/objective 战略目标strategic marketing program 战略营销计划strategic pricing objectives 战略定价目标strategic withdrawal 战略撤退strategy constraints 战略影响因素strategy formulation and implementation 战略制定和实施strategy implementation 战略实施strategy reassessment 战略重估subculture 亚文化subfactor 次级因素substitute goods 替代品substitution threat 替代产品的威胁success rates 成功率Sumitomo 住友商事Sun Microsystems 太阳微系统supermarkets 超级市场supplementary media 辅助性广告媒体suppliers' bargaining power 供应商的讨价还价能力surrogate products 替代产品survey 调查营销英语词汇大全5 shopping goods 消费品short-term memory 短期记忆signal vehicle/carrier 信号载体simulated test marketing 模拟市场测试single-factor index 单因素指数法single-line mass-merchandiser stores 单一类型产品专营连锁店SKF 瑞典轴承公司skimming and early withdrawal 撇脂与尽早撤离战略skimming pricing 撇脂定价法sleepwalker/contented underachievers 梦游者/很容易满足的人slotting allowance 安置津贴social acceptability 社会可接受性social class 社会阶层social objectives 社会目标sociocultural environment 社会文化环境soft goods 非耐用品soft technology 软技术sole ownership entry strategy 独享所有权的进入战略Sony 索尼source credibility 信息来源的可信度source 广告信息来源sources of data 数据来源sources of new-product ideas 新产品创意来源speciality goods 特殊品speciality retailers 专营零售商speciality stores 专营商店specialization 专门化spokesperson 代言人Sprint 斯普林特Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 标准工业分类代码standardization strategy 标准化战略standby positioning 备用定位staple goods 日常用品Starbucks 星巴克stars 明星类。

buyingandselling英语作文The art of buying and selling is one that has been honed over centuries as a fundamental aspect of human commerce and exchange. At its core buying and selling is the negotiation of value between two parties where one party seeks to acquire goods or services in exchange for payment while the other party seeks to profit from the transaction. This delicate balance of interests has driven the evolution of markets economies and shaped the way we conduct business on a global scale.The basic premise of buying and selling is relatively straightforward - one party has a good or service that they are willing to part with in exchange for compensation usually in the form of currency. The buyer, on the other hand, has a need or desire for that good or service and is willing to pay a certain price to obtain it. The challenge lies in determining the appropriate price that satisfies both the buyer's willingness to pay and the seller's need to profit.Historically this process of negotiation took place in physical marketplaces where buyers and sellers would congregate to barterand trade. The haggling and bargaining that occurred in these bustling hubs of commerce was an integral part of the buying and selling experience. Customers would carefully inspect goods examining quality craftsmanship and utility while sellers would tout the virtues of their wares in an attempt to command the highest possible price.With the advent of modern commerce and the rise of globalized trade networks the nature of buying and selling has evolved dramatically. No longer are transactions limited to face-to-face interactions in centralized market spaces. Today's buyers and sellers are able to connect across vast distances engaging in commercial exchanges through a variety of channels including brick-and-mortar stores e-commerce platforms and peer-to-peer online marketplaces.This shift towards a more digital landscape has introduced new complexities and considerations into the buying and selling dynamic. Online sellers must carefully curate their product listings optimize their marketing and ensure seamless logistics and customer service to remain competitive. Buyers on the other hand have access to a seemingly limitless array of options and must navigate a sea of reviews ratings and comparison tools to make informed purchasing decisions.Despite these technological advancements however the coreprinciples of buying and selling remain the same. Both parties are still seeking to maximize value and achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. The savvy buyer aims to obtain the best possible goods or services at the lowest price while the skilled seller strives to attract customers offer compelling value propositions and secure the highest profit margins.This delicate dance between buyers and sellers is what drives the engine of commerce and fuels economic growth on a global scale. Every day millions of transactions take place as individuals and businesses exchange money for the things they need and want. From the purchase of a morning coffee to the negotiation of a multi-million dollar merger the act of buying and selling is a fundamental part of the human experience.Of course the specific dynamics of these transactions can vary greatly depending on the nature of the goods or services involved as well as the broader economic and regulatory environment. In some cases buying and selling may be a straightforward transactional process with little room for negotiation. Think of purchasing a gallon of milk at the grocery store or renewing a subscription to a news publication.In other scenarios however the buying and selling process can be far more complex and nuanced. The sale of a home or the procurement of industrial equipment for example may involve extensive researchdue diligence and negotiations between multiple stakeholders. In these high-stakes situations both buyers and sellers must exercise greater care and strategic thinking to ensure they achieve their desired outcomes.Ultimately the art of buying and selling is one that requires a delicate balance of skill knowledge and emotional intelligence. Effective buyers must be savvy researchers adept negotiators and discerning consumers. Successful sellers on the other hand must be masterful marketers persuasive communicators and astute business operators.As the global marketplace continues to evolve the importance of these capabilities will only grow. In an increasingly crowded and competitive commercial landscape the ability to buy and sell with sophistication and savvy will be a key differentiator for both individuals and organizations. Those who can navigate the complexities of modern commerce with deftness and finesse will be poised to thrive while others may struggle to keep pace.In conclusion the act of buying and selling is a fundamental pillar of human economic activity. From the most basic consumer transactions to the highest-stakes business deals the interplay between buyers and sellers shapes the flow of commerce and fuels economic progress. As technology continues to transform the landscape of commerce the skills and strategies required to buy andsell effectively will only become more crucial. Those who master this art will be well-positioned to succeed in an increasingly dynamic and competitive global marketplace.。

反垄断怎么说英语作文As the global economy continues to grow, the issue of antitrust has become increasingly important. Antitrust is a legal framework designed to promote competition and prevent monopolies from dominating the market. In recent years, many countries have implemented antitrust laws to regulate the behavior of large corporations and protect consumers.The concept of antitrust can be traced back to the late 19th century, when the United States passed its first antitrust law, the Sherman Antitrust Act. This law was designed to prevent monopolies from controlling the market and to promote competition. Since then, many other countries have passed similar laws to protect their markets and consumers.The main goal of antitrust laws is to promote competition and prevent monopolies from dominating the market. A monopoly is a situation where one companycontrols the entire market, which can lead to higher pricesand reduced innovation. Antitrust laws aim to prevent this by regulating the behavior of large corporations and promoting competition.There are several ways that antitrust laws can be enforced. One way is through mergers and acquisitions. When two companies merge, it can create a monopoly in the market. Antitrust laws can be used to prevent this by requiring companies to divest certain assets or by blocking themerger altogether.Another way that antitrust laws can be enforced is through price fixing. Price fixing is when companiescollude to set prices, which can lead to higher prices for consumers. Antitrust laws can be used to prevent this by imposing fines or even criminal charges on companies that engage in price fixing.In addition to preventing monopolies and promoting competition, antitrust laws can also protect consumers. For example, antitrust laws can be used to prevent companies from engaging in false advertising or deceptive practices.They can also be used to ensure that consumers have access to a variety of products and services at reasonable prices.Overall, antitrust is an important legal framework that is designed to promote competition and prevent monopolies from dominating the market. As the global economy continues to grow, it is important for countries to implement and enforce antitrust laws to protect consumers and promote a healthy economy.。

Competition in Two-Sided MarketsMark ArmstrongDepartment of EconomicsUniversity College LondonAugust2002:revised May2005AbstractThere are many examples of markets involving two groups of agents who need to interact via“platforms”,and where one group’s bene…t from joining a platform dependson the number of agents from the other group who join the same platform.This paperpresents theoretical models for three variants of such markets:a monopoly platform;amodel of competing platforms where each agent must choose to join a single platform;and a model of“competing bottlenecks”,where one group wishes to join all platforms.The main determinants of equilibrium prices are(i)the relative sizes of the cross-groupexternalities,(ii)whether fees are levied on a lump-sum or per-transaction basis,and(iii)whether a group joins just one platform or joins all platforms.1Introduction and SummaryThere are many examples of markets where two or more groups of agents interact via inter-mediaries or“platforms”.Surplus is created—or perhaps destroyed in the case of negative externalities—when the groups interact.Of course,there are countless examples where…rms compete to deal with two or more groups.Any…rm is likely to do better if its products appeal to both men and women,for instance.However,in a set of interesting cases,cross-group network e¤ects are present,and the bene…t enjoyed by a member of one group depends upon how well the platform does in attracting custom from the other group.For instance,a heterosexual dating agency or nightclub can only do well if it succeeds in attracting business from both men and women.This paper is about such markets.An early version of this paper was presented at the ESEM meeting in Venice,August2002.I am grateful to the editor and two referees,to the audiences at many seminar presentations,to Simon Anderson,Carli Coetzee, Jacques Crémer,Xavier Vives and especially to Julian Wright for discussion,correction and information.1A brief list of other such markets includes:credit cards(for a given set of charges,a consumer is more likely to use a credit card which is accepted widely by retailers,while a retailer is more likely to accept a card which is carried by more consumers);television channels (where viewers generally prefer to watch a channel with fewer adverts,while an advertiser is prepared to pay more to place an advert on a channel with more viewers);and shopping malls (where a consumer is more likely to visit a mall with a greater range of retailers,while a retailer is willing to pay more to locate in a mall with a greater number of consumers passing through).See Rochet and Tirole(2003)for further examples of such markets.As this paper will argue in more detail,there are three main factors that determine the pattern of relative prices o¤ered to the two groups in equilibrium.Relative sizes of cross-group externalities:If a member of group1exerts a large positive externality on each member of group2,then group1will be targeted aggressively by platforms. In broad terms,and especially in competitive markets,it is group1’s bene…t to the other group that determines group1’s price,not how much group1bene…ts from the presence of group2 (see Proposition2below).In a nightclub,if men gain more from interacting with women than vice versa then we expect there to be a tendency for nightclubs to o¤er women lower entry fees than men.Unless they act to tip the industry to monopoly,positive cross-group network externalities act to intensify competition and reduce platform pro…ts—see expression(13)below.In order to be able to compete e¤ectively on one side of the market,a platform needs to perform well on the other side(and vice versa).This creates a downward pressure on the prices to both sides compared to the case where no cross-group network e¤ects exist.This implies that platforms would like to…nd ways to mitigate network e¤ects.One method of doing this is discussed next.Fixed fees or per-transaction charges:Platforms might charge for their services on a lump-sum basis,so that an agent’s payment does not explicitly depend on how well the platform performs on the other side of the market.Alternatively,if it is technologically feasible,the payment might be an explicit function of the platform’s performance on the other side.One example of this latter practice is where a TV channel or a newspaper makes its advertising charge an increasing function of the audience or readership it obtains.Similarly,a credit card network levies(most of)its charges on a per-transaction basis,while the bulk of a real estate agent’s fees are levied only in the event of a sale.The crucial di¤erence between the two charging bases is that cross-group externalities are weaker with per-transaction charges,since a fraction of the bene…t of interacting with an extra agent on the other side is eroded by the extra payment incurred.If an agent has to pay a platform only in the event of a successful interaction,then that agent does not need to worry about how well that platform will do in its dealings with the other side.That is to say,to attract one side of the market,it is not so important that the platform…rst gets the other side“on board”.Because network e¤ects are lessened with per-transactions charges,it is plausible that platform pro…ts are higher when this2form of charging is used.1(See Propositions3and5for illustrations of this e¤ect.)Finally,the distinction between the two forms of tari¤only matters when there are competing platforms. When there is a monopoly platform(see section3below),it makes no di¤erence to outcomes if tari¤s are levied on a lump-sum or per-transaction basis.Single-homing or multi-homing:When an agent chooses to use only one platform it has become common to say that the agent is“single-homing”.When an agent uses several platforms he is said to“multi-home”.It makes a signi…cant di¤erence to outcomes whether groups single-home or multi-home.In the broadest terms,there are three main cases to consider:(i)both groups single-home;(ii)one group single-homes while the other multi-homes,and(iii)both groups multi-home.If interacting with the other side is the primary reason for an agent to join a platform,then we might not expect case(iii)to be very common—if each member of group2joins all platforms,there is no need for any member of group1to join more than one platform—and so this con…guration is not analyzed in the paper.Con…guration(i)is discussed in section4.While the analysis of this case provides many useful insights about two-sided markets,it is hard to think of many markets that…t this con…guration precisely.By contrast,there are several important markets that look like con…guration(iii),and in section5these cases are termed“competitive bottlenecks”.Here,if it wishes to interact with an agent on the single-homing side,the multi-homing side has no choice except to deal with that agent’s chosen platform.Thus,platforms have monopoly power over providing access to their single-homing customers for the multi-homing side.This monopoly power naturally leads to high prices being charged to the multi-homing side,and there will be too few agents on this side being served from a social point of view(Proposition4).2By contrast,platforms do have to compete for the single-homing agents,and high pro…ts generated from the multi-homing side are to a large extent passed on to the single-homing side in the form of low prices(or even zero prices).Before embarking on this analysis in more detail,in the next section there is a selective literature review,followed in section3by an analysis of the monopoly platform case.1An exception to this occurs when the market tips to monopoly.In that case the incumbent’s pro…ts typically increase with the size of the network e¤ects since entrants…nd it hard to gain a toehold even when the incumbent sets high prices.This partly explains one conclusion of Caillaud and Jullien(2003),which is that equilibrium pro…ts typically rise when platforms cannot use transaction charges.2This tendency towards high prices for the multi-homing side is tempered somewhat when the single-homing side bene…ts from having many agents from the other side on the platform,for then high prices to the multi-homing side will drive away that side and thus disadvantage the platform when it tries to attract the single-homing side.However,this point is never su¢cient to undermine the basic result that the price charged to the multi-homing side is too high.32Related LiteratureI discuss some of the related literature later,as it becomes most relevant in the paper(especially in section5below).However,it is useful to discuss two pioneering papers up front.Caillaud and Jullien(2003)discuss the case of competing matchmakers,such as dating agencies,real estate agents,and internet“business-to-business”websites.3There is potentially a rich set of contracting possibilities.For instance,a platform might have a subscription charge in combination with a charge in the event of a successful match.In addition,Caillaud and Jullien allow platforms to set negative subscription charges,and to make their pro…t from taxing transactions on the platform.Caillaud and Jullien…rst examine the case where all agents must single-home.(I provide a parallel analysis in section4below.)In this case,there is essentially perfect competition,and agents have no intrinsic preference for one platform over another except insofar as one platform has more agents from the other side or charges lower prices.Therefore,the e¢cient outcome is for all agents to use the same platform. Caillaud and Jullien’s Proposition1shows that the only equilibria in this case involve one platform signing up all agents(as is e¢cient)and that platform making zero pro…ts.The equilibrium structure of prices involves negative subscription fees and maximal transactions charges,since this is the most pro…table way to prevent entry.Caillaud and Jullien go on to analyze the more complicated case where agents can multi-home.They analyze several possibilities,but the cases most relevant for this paper are what they term“mixed equilibria”(see their Propositions8and11).These correspond to the“competitive bottleneck”situations in this paper,and involve one side multi-homing and the other side single-homing.They…nd that the single-homing side is treated favourably(indeed,its price is necessarily no higher than its cost)while the multi-homing side has all its surplus extracted.I discuss the relationship between the two approaches in more detail in section5.5below.The second closely related paper is Rochet and Tirole(2003).The‡avour of their analysis can be understood in the context of the credit card market(although the analysis applies more widely).On one side of the market are consumers and on the other side is the set of retailers,and facilitating the interaction between these two groups are two competing credit card networks.For much of their analysis,the credit card platforms levy charges purely on a per-transaction basis,and there are no lump-sum fees for either side.Suppose that one credit card o¤ers a lower transaction fee to retailers than its rival.A retailer choosing between accepting just the cheaper card or accepting both cards faces a trade-o¤.If it accepts just the cheaper card then its consumers have a stark choice between paying by this card or not using a card at all.Alternatively,if it accepts both cards then(i)more consumers will choose to pay by some card but(ii)fewer consumers will use the retailer’s preferred lower-cost card.If a credit card reduces its charge to retailers relative to its rival,this will“steer”some retailers which previously accepted both cards to accept only the lower-cost card.In a symmetric equilibrium,all retailers accept both credit cards(or neither),while consumers always use 3See also van Raalte and Webers(1998).4their preferred credit card.The share of the charges that are borne by the two sides dependson how closely consumers view the two cards as substitutes.If few consumers switch cardsin response to a price cut on their side,then consumers should pay a large share of the totaltransaction charge;if consumers view the cards as close substitutes,then retailers will bearmost of the charges in equilibrium.Rochet and Tirole also consider the case where there are…xed fees as well as per-transaction fees,under the assumption that consumers use a singlecard.This is essentially the same model as the competitive bottleneck model in this paper,and I discuss this part of their paper in more detail in section5.5below.There are a number of modelling di¤erences between the current paper and Rochet andTirole(2003)which concern the speci…cation of agents’utility,the structure of platforms’fees,and the structure of platforms’costs.4In both papers agent j has gross utility from usingplatform i of the formu i j= i j n i+ i j:Here n i is the number of agents from the other side who are present on the platform, i j is the bene…t that agent j enjoys from each agent on the other side,and i j is the…xed bene…t the agent obtains from using that platform.Rochet and Tirole assume that i j does not dependon i or j(and can be set equal to zero),but that i j varies both with agent j and platformi.In section3and4of the current paper,by contrast,I assume that i j does not depend on i or j but only on which side of the market the agent is on,while i j depends on the agentand on the platform.(In section5I suppose that the interaction term for one side does vary.)The decision whether to make agents’heterogeneity to do with the interaction term or the…xed e¤ect has major implications for the structure of prices to the two sides in equilibrium.For instance,with a monopoly platform the formulas for pro…t-maximizing prices look verydi¤erent in the two papers.Moreover,when i j depends on the platform i,an agent caresabout on which platform the transaction takes place(if there is a choice):this e¤ect plays amajor role in Rochet and Tirole’s analysis but is absent in the present paper.5Turning to the structure of the platforms’fees,for the most part Rochet and Tirole assumethat agents pay a per-transaction fee for each agent on the platform from the other side.Ifthis fee is denoted i then agent j’s net utility on platform i is u i j=( i j i)n i(when is set equal to zero).This con…rms the discussion in section1above that per-transactionscharges act to reduce the size of network e¤ects.In the monopoly platform case,an agent’sincentive to join the platform does not depend on the platform’s performance on the otherside,and she will join if and only if i j i.The present paper,especially in section4, 4The assumptions in Caillaud and Jullien(2003)to do with utility and costs are closer to the current paper than to Rochet and Tirole.Caillaud and Jullien do not have any intrinsic product di¤erentiation between the platforms.However,there is a bene…t to join two platforms rather than one since they assume that there is a better chance of a match between buyers and sellers when two platforms are involved.5A recent paper that encompasses these two approaches with a monopoly platform is Rochet and Tirole (2004),where simultaneous heterogeneity in both and is allowed.However,a full analysis of this case is technically challenging in the case of competing platforms.5assumes that platform charges are levied as a lump-sum fee,p i say,in which case the agent’s net utility is u i j= n i+ i j p i.The…nal modelling di¤erence between the two papers is with the speci…cation of costs:Rochet and Tirole assume mainly that a platform’s costs are incurred on a per-transaction basis,so that if a platform has n1group1agents and n2group 2agents its total cost is cn1n2for some per-transaction cost c.In the current paper costs are often modelled as being incurred when agents join a network,so that a platform’s total cost is f1n1+f2n2for some per-agent costs f1and f2.Which assumptions concerning tari¤s and costs best re‡ects reality depends on the context.Rochet and Tirole’s model is well suited to the credit card context,for instance,whereas the assumptions in the current paper are intended to better re‡ect markets such as nightclubs,shopping malls and newspapers.3Model I:A Monopoly PlatformThis section presents the analysis for a monopoly platform.This framework does not apply to most of the examples of two-sided markets that come to mind,although there are a few applications.For instance,yellow pages directories are often a monopoly of the incumbent telephone company,shopping malls or nightclubs are sometimes far enough away from others that the monopoly paradigm might be appropriate,and sometimes there is only one newspaper or magazine in the relevant market.Suppose there are two groups of agents,denoted1and2.A member of one group cares about the number of the other group who use the platform.(For simplicity,I ignore the possibility that agents care also about the number of the same group who join the platform.) Suppose that the utility of an agent is determined in the following way:if the platform attracts n1and n2members of the two groups,the utilities of a group1and a group2agent are respectivelyu1= 1n2 p1;u2= 2n1 p2;(1) where p1and p2are the platform’s prices to the two groups.The parameter 1measures the bene…t that a group1agent enjoys from interacting with each group2agent,and 2measures the bene…t a group2agent obtains from each group1agent.Expression(1)describes how utility is determined as a function of the numbers of agents who participate.To close the demand model I specify the numbers who participate as a function of the utilities:if the utilities o¤ered to the two groups are u1and u2,suppose that the numbers of each group who join the platform aren1= 1(u1);n2= 2(u2)for some increasing functions 1and 2.Turning to the cost side,suppose that the platform incurs a per-agent cost f1for serving group1and per-agent cost f2for group2.Therefore,the…rm’s pro…t is =n1(p1 f1)+ n2(p2 f2).If we consider the platform to be o¤ering utilities f u1;u2g rather than prices f p1;p2g,then the implicit price for group1is p1= 1n2 u1(and similarly for group2).6Therefore,expressed in terms of utilities,the platform’s pro…t is(u1;u2)=[ 1 2(u2) u1 f1] 1(u1)+[ 2 1(u1) u2 f2] 2(u2):(2) Let the aggregate consumer surplus of group1be v1(u1),where v1satis…es the envelope condition v01(u1) 1(u1),and similarly for group2.Then total welfare,as measured by the unweighted sum of pro…t and consumer surplus,isw= (u1;u2)+v1(u1)+v2(u2):It is easily veri…ed that the…rst-best welfare maximizing outcome involves utilities satisfying:u1=( 1+ 2)n2 f1;u2=( 1+ 2)n1 f2:From expression(1)the socially optimal prices satisfyp1=f1 2n2;p2=f2 1n1:As one would expect,the optimal price for group1,say,equals the cost of supplying service to a type1agent adjusted downwards by the external bene…t that an extra group1agent brings to the group2agents on the platform.(There are n2group2agents on the platform, and each one bene…ts by 2when an extra group1agent joins.)In particular,prices should ideally be below cost if 1; 2>0.From expression(2),the pro…t-maximizing prices satisfyp1=f1 2n2+ 1(u1)01(u1);p2=f2 1n1+ 2(u2)02(u2):(3)Thus,the pro…t-maximizing price for group1,say,is equal to the cost of providing service(f1), adjusted downwards by the external bene…t( 2n2),and adjusted upwards by a factor related to the elasticity of the group’s participation.The pro…t-maximizing prices can be obtained in the more familiar form of Lerner indices and elasticities,as recorded in the following result: Proposition1Write1(p1j n2)=p1 01( 1n2 p1)1( 1n2 p1); 2(p2j n1)=p2 02( 2n1 p2) 2( 2n1 p2)for a group’s price elasticity of demand for a given level of participation by the other group. Then the pro…t-maximizing pair of prices satisfyp1 (f1 2n2)p1=11(p1j n2);p2 (f2 1n1)p2=12(p2j n1):(4) 7It is possible that the pro…t-maximizing outcome might involve group1,say,being o¤ereda subsidised service,i.e.,p1<f1.From(4),this happens if the group’s elasticity of demandis high and/or if the external bene…t enjoyed by group2is large.Indeed,the subsidy mightbe so large that the resulting price is negative(or zero,if negative prices are not feasible).This analysis applies,in a stylized way,to a market with a monopoly yellow page directory.Such directories typically are given to telephone subscribers for free,and pro…ts are made fromcharges to advertisers.The analysis might also apply to software markets where one type ofsoftware is required to create…les in a certain format and another type of software is requiredto read such…les.(For the analysis to apply accurately,though,there needs to be two disjointgroups of agents:those who wish to read…les and those who wish to create…les.It does notreadily apply when most people wish to perform both tasks.)4Model II:Two-Sided Single-HomingThis model involves competing platforms,but assumes that,for exogenous reasons,each agentfrom either group chooses to join a single platform.4.1Basic ModelThe model extends the previous monopoly model in a natural way.There are two groups ofagents,1and2,and there are two platforms,A and B,which enable the two groups to interact.Groups1and2obtain the respective utilities f u i1;u i2g from platform i.These utilities f u i1;u i2g are determined in a similar manner to the monopoly model expressed in(1):if platform iattracts n i1and n i2members of the two groups,the utilities on this platform areu i1= 1n i2 p i1;u i2= 2n i1 p i2;(5) where f p i1;p i2g are the respective prices charged by the platform to the two groups.When group1is o¤ered a choice of utilities u A1and u B1from the two platforms,and group2is o¤ered the choice u A2and u B2,suppose that the number of each group who go to platformi is given by the Hotelling speci…cation:n i1=12+u i1 u j12t1;n i2=12+u i2 u j22t2:(6)Here,agents in a group are assumed to be uniformly located along a unit interval with the two platforms located at the two end-points,and t1,t2>0are the product di¤erentiation(or transport cost)parameters for the two groups that determine the competitiveness of the two markets.8Putting(6)together with(5),and using the fact that n j1=1 n i1,gives the following implicit expressions for market shares:n i1=12+1(2n i2 1) (p i1 p j1)2t1;n i2=12+2(2n i1 1) (p i2 p j2)2t2:(7)Expressions(7)show that,keeping its group2price…xed,an extra group1agent on a platformattracts a further 2t2group2agents to that platform.Suppose that the network externality parameters f 1; 2g are small compared to the dif-ferentiation parameters f t1;t2g so that I can focus on market-sharing equilibria.(If network e¤ects were large compared to brand preferences then there could only be equilibria where one platform corners both sides of the market.)It turns out that the necessary and su¢cient condition for a market-sharing equilibrium to exist is the following:4t1t2>( 1+ 2)2(8) and this inequality is assumed to hold in the following analysis.Suppose that platforms A and B o¤er the respective price pairs(p A1;p A2)and(p B1;p B2). Solving the simultaneous equations(7)implies that market shares are determined by the four prices as:n i1=12+121(p j2 p i2)+t2(p j1 p i1)t1t2 1 2;n i2=12+122(p j1 p i1)+t1(p j2 p i2)t1t2 1 2:(9)(Assumption(8)implies that the above denominators t1t2 1 2are positive.)Thus,assuming 1; 2>0,a platform’s market share for one group is decreasing in its price o¤ered to the other group.As with the monopoly model,suppose that each platform has a per-agent cost f1for serving group1and f2for serving group2.Therefore,pro…ts for platform i are(p i1 f1)"12+12 1(p j2 p i2)+t2(p j1 p i1)t1t2 1 2#+(p i2 f2)"12+12 2(p j1 p i1)+t1(p j2 p i2)t1t2 1 2#:This expression is quadratic in platform i’s prices,and is concave in these prices if and only if assumption(8)holds.Therefore,platform i’s best response to j’s prices is characterized by the…rst-order conditions.Given assumption(8),one can check there are no asymmetric equilibria.For the case of a symmetric equilibrium where each platform o¤ers the same price pair(p1;p2),the…rst-order conditions for equilibrium prices arep1=f1+t1 2t2( 1+p2 f2);p2=f2+t2 1t1( 2+p1 f1):(10)Expressions(10)can be interpreted in the following manner.First,note that in a Hotelling model without network e¤ects,the equilibrium price for group1would be p1=f1+t1.In9this two-sided setting the price is adjusted downwards by the factor 2t2( 1+p2 f2).Thisadjustment factor can be decomposed into two parts.The term( 1+p2 f2)represents the “external”bene…t to a platform of having an additional group2agent.To see this,note…rst that the platform makes pro…t(p2 f2)from each extra group2agent.Second, 1measures the extra revenue the platform can extract from its group1agents(without losing market share)when it has an extra group2agent.6Thus( 1+p2 f2)indeed represents the external bene…t to a platform of attracting the marginal group2agent.Finally,as shown in expression(7),a platform attracts 2t2extra group2agents when it has an extra group1agent.In sum,the adjustment factor 22( 1+p2 f2)measures the external bene…t to the platform fromattracting an extra group1agent;in other words,it measures the opportunity cost of raising the group1price enough to cause one group1agent to leave.I summarize this discussion by an annotated version of formula(10):p1=f1|{z}cost of service+t1|{z}market power factor 2t2|{z}extra group2agents( 1+p2 f2)|{z}pro…t from each extra group2agent(11)Finally,solving the simultaneous equations(10)implies that p1=f1+t1 2and p2= f2+t2 1:This discussion is summarized as:Proposition2Suppose that assumption(8)holds.Then the model with two-sided single-homing has a unique equilibrium which is symmetric.Equilibrium prices for group1and group2are given byp1=f1+t1 2;p2=f2+t2 1:(12) Thus,a platform will target one group more aggressively than the other if that group is (i)on the more competitive side of the market and/or(ii)causes larger bene…ts to the other group than vice versa.7While expressions(12)are certainly“simple”,they are not intuitive,and this is why I focussed the discussion on(10).The fact that,say,group1’s price does not depend on its own externality parameter 1is surely an artifact of the Hotelling speci…cation for consumer demand.In particular,the fact that the total size of each group is…xed,so that when platforms set low prices they only steal business from the rival rather than expand the overall 6An extra group2agent means that the utility of each group1agent on the platform increases by 1,while the utility of each group1agent on the rival platform falls by 1.Therefore,the relative utility for group1 agents being on the platform increases by2 1and each of the agents can bear a price increase equal to this. Since in equilibrium a platform has half the group1agents,the extra revenue it can extract from these agents is 1,as claimed.7It is possible given our assumptions that one price in the above expression is negative.This happens if that side of the market involves a low cost,is competitive,or causes a large external bene…t to the other side. In many cases it is not realistic to suppose that negative prices are feasible,in which case the analysis needs to be adapted explicitly to incorporate the non-negativity constraints—see Armstrong and Wright(2004)for this analysis.10。

Vardit Landsman&Stefan Stremersch Multihoming in Two-Sided Markets: An Empirical Inquiry in the Video Game Console IndustryTwo-sided markets are composed of platform owners and two distinct user networks that either buy or sell appli-cations for the platform.The authors focus on multihoming—the choice of an agent in a user network to use more than one platform.In the context of the video game console industry,they examine the conditions affecting seller-level multihoming decisions on a given platform.Furthermore,they investigate how platform-level multihom-ing of applications affects the sales of the platform.The authors show that increased platform-level multihoming of applications hurts platform sales,afinding consistent with literature on brand differentiation,but they also show that this effect vanishes as platforms mature or gain market share.The authorsfind that platform-level multihom-ing of applications affects platform sales more strongly than the number of applications.Furthermore,among mature platforms,an increasing market share leads to more seller-level multihoming,while among nascent plat-forms,seller-level multihoming decreases as platform market share increases.Thesefindings prompt scholars to look beyond network size in analyzing two-sided markets and provide guidance to both(application)sellers and platform owners.Keywords:two-sided markets,multihoming,entertainment markets,indirect network effects,video game industryA two-sided market is composed of two distinct usernetworks that provide each other with network ben-efits through a platform by either buying or sell-ing applications for the platform(Rochet and Tirole2006). We refer to these distinct user networks—the two sides of the market—as buyers and sellers,respectively.Two-sided markets are pervasive in today’s economy.For example, consumers will prefer a credit card that many merchants accept,while merchants will prefer a credit card that many consumers carry.Similarly,buyers will prefer auction sites with a large number of sellers,while sellers will prefer auc-tion sites on which many buyers bid.Other examples of two-sided markets are entertainment platforms(consumers and content publishers),shopping malls(consumers and retail outlets),and computer networks(computer users and software providers).Vardit Landsman is Assistant Professor of Marketing,Leon Reca-nati Graduate School of Business Administration,Tel-Aviv Univer-sity,and Erasmus School of Economics,Erasmus University(e-mail: landsman@ese.eur.nl).Stefan Stremersch is Chair of Marketing and Desiderius Erasmus Distinguished Chair of Economics,Eras-mus School of Economics,Erasmus University,and Professor of Marketing,IESE Business School,Universidad de Navarra(e-mail: stremersch@ese.eur.nl).The authors thank the NPD Group and, more specifically,Martin Zagorsek,Richard Ow,and Chris Bodmer for their generous data support;Jeroen Binken for intellectual stim-ulation;and Nuno Camacho,Florian Deutzmann,Bas Donkers,and Dennis Fok for providing insightful comments.Both economists and marketing scholars have inves-tigated two-sided markets(for a review,see Stremersch et al.2007),studying new product growth or competition between platforms.Prior literature examining two-sided markets has focused almost exclusively on quantity(i.e., the size of the two user networks)as the network benefit that the two sides of the market contribute to each other (e.g.,Basu,Mazumdar,and Raj2003;Church and Gandal 1992,1993;Dranove and Gandal2003;Frels,Shervani, and Srivastava2003;Gandal,Kende,and Rob2000;Katz and Shapiro1985;LeNagard-Assayag and Manceau2001; Nair,Chintagunta,and Dubé2004;Stremersch et al.2007). However,user networks may contribute to each other in dimensions other than their mere size—for example,in quality(Binken and Stremersch2009)or in the extent of multihoming(the current study).Multihoming refers to the choice of an agent in a user network to use more than one platform.Single-homing refers to the choice of an agent in a user network to use only one platform.Single-homing and multihoming are logical opposites,and we conceptualize and operationalize both concepts as such in the rest of the article.This article focuses in particular on multihoming decisions of sellers rather than of buyers.1We differentiate seller-level multihoming on a given plat-form(i.e.,the extent to which the applications of a par-ticular seller on the platform are also available for buyers 1Multihoming among buyers(e.g.,consumers owning multiple video game console platforms)is beyond the scope of the current study.©2011,American Marketing AssociationISSN:0022-2429(print),1547-7185(electronic)39Journal of MarketingVol.75(November2011),39–54of competing platforms)from platform-level multihoming (i.e.,the extent to which applications on a particular plat-form are also available for buyers of a competing platform). Thus,platform-level multihoming represents the aggrega-tion of seller-level multihoming over all sellers providing applications for a particular platform.A seller can multi-home many(few)of its applications for a given platform, which in our terminology reflects a high(low)degree of seller-level multihoming.At the platform level,many(few) of the applications available for a platform across all sell-ers may be multihomed,which in our terminology reflects a high(low)degree of platform-level multihoming. Theoretical models have suggested that the extent to which applications on a particular platform are multi-homed(platform-level multihoming)constitutes an impor-tant driver of the outcome of platform competition (Armstrong2006;Armstrong and Wright2007;Caillaud and Jullien2003;Hermalin and Katz2006;Rochet and Tirole2006).The special relevance of multihoming to plat-form owners(Shapiro1999)stems from the fact that the differentiation of a platform partially lies with the differ-entiation of the characteristics of its user network(s)from the characteristics of the user network(s)of competing plat-forms,beyond the differentiation between the other charac-teristics(e.g.,hardware)of the platforms.Seller-level multihoming decisions are important deci-sions for sellers in two-sided markets.On the one hand,a seller that single-homes on a given platform forgoes poten-tial revenues from the buyers of competing platforms.On the other hand,single-homing sellers may have lower costs (e.g.,they avoid the cost of adapting their applications to multiple platforms)or be paid exclusivity fees by owners of platforms on which they single-home.Multihoming decisions are of great importance tofirms in many contexts.For example,researchers credit the single-homing decision by several movie studios(e.g., Warner Brothers)as an important factor in the platform bat-tle between Toshiba’s HD DVD and Sony’s Blu-ray(Barnes 2007;Edwards and Grover2008).Sony is also reported to have paid a substantial amount to movie studios to pre-vent attractive movies on Blu-ray from being multihomed to HD DVD.The video game console market—the context of the current study—is another market in which sellers’multi-homing decisions may significantly affect their profits.For example,Take-Two’s Rockstar Games unit was reported to have received an estimated$50million from Microsoft to create two episodes of Grand Theft Auto IV:The Lost and Damned and single-home them for Microsoft Xbox360. However,by single-homing,Take-Two’s Rockstar Games unit missed the revenues that these games might have gen-erated,especially from Sony PlayStation3users.Despite the high relevance of multihoming in many industries and a stream of recent analytical research(mostly in economics),little empirical research on multihoming exists(for exceptions,which we in turn extend,see Binken and Stremersch2009;Corts and Lederman2009;Rys-man2004).More precisely,we study two research ques-tions,which have remained largely unaddressed by prior (empirical)literature.First,we investigate what conditions affect seller-level multihoming decisions on a given plat-form(in our case,multihoming decisions of game publish-ers).Second,we study whether and under what conditions platform-level multihoming affects the sales of the platform (in our case,sales of video game consoles),explicitly con-trolling for the number of applications sold for the platform. We focus on the age and market share of the platform as conditions that may influence the extent of seller-level multihoming on the platform and the effect of platform-level multihoming on platform sales.Both age and market share of a platform significantly affect the uncertainty that consumers face in their platform adoption decision.Uncer-tainty plays a dominant role in any new technology adop-tion,but does so especially in two-sided markets because the future adoption by the seller network affects the future utility of a platform for consumers.The uncertainty regard-ing a platform decreases with age and market share,which in turn affects the extent to which the platform needs a clearly differentiated positioning to be successful.Thus,in short,nascent and low-market-share platforms may have a greater need for a differentiated network of sellers than mature and high-market-share platforms.Our empiricalfindings are as follows:Wefind that the (negative)effect of platform-level multihoming on platform sales is larger than the(positive)effect of the number of applications on platform sales.We alsofind that this neg-ative effect of multihoming is prominent for nascent plat-forms and for platforms with a small market share but it fades as platforms mature and gain market share.These findings have implications for sellers and platform owners. They may provide sellers with a better understanding of the conditions under which the platform owner may be willing to pay more or less for single-homed applications.Platform owners can also gain understanding of the conditions in which it benefits them to encourage or discourage single-homed applications for their platforms.Thesefindings may also affect the future behavior of industry observers(e.g., in the reports they publish)and academic scholars(e.g.,in the models they develop)because they force both observers and academics to move away from the logic of network size to the logic of multihoming.We alsofind that a platform’s age and market share, among other factors,drive the extent of seller-level multi-homing on that platform.On the one hand,the larger the market share of a mature platform among buyers,the more of its applications will be multihomed.On the other hand, the larger the market share of a nascent platform,the fewer of its applications will be multihomed.We organize the remainder of this article as follows:In the next section,we review the literature on multihoming. Then,we develop hypotheses for the effects of multihom-ing on platform sales and for the determinants of multihom-ing.The fourth section presents the data we use to test the developed theory.We develop our model in thefifth section and present the estimation procedure in the sixth section. We present the estimation results in the seventh section.We conclude with a discussion of the implications and limita-tions of our research.Prior Literature on Multihoming We can distinguish two types of prior analytical models on multihoming in two-sided markets.Thefirst type examines what the equilibrium outcome is if a multihoming option exists for a user group,without the(potential)existence of40/Journal of Marketing,November2011exclusive contracts(Armstrong2006;Caillaud and Jullien 2003;Choi2007;Doganoglu and Wright2006;Rochet and Tirole2003,2006).Most relevant to our own inquiry is the theoretical model Choi(2007)proposes,which con-siders the level of suitability of a seller’s applications for a specific platform as a determinant of that seller’s deci-sion to single-home its applications on that platform.In our theoretical framework,we also adopt this notion of seller–platformfit as one of the factors influencing multihoming decisions.We theorize that thefit between a seller and a given platform is conveyed through the sales success of the sellers’applications among the buyers of the platform.2A second set of models examines the equilibrium out-come if a platform owner offers an option of an exclusive contract—a contract under which agents in a user network commit to single-home on a given platform—in a con-text in which the multihoming option exists,or in specific settings of platforms’competitive strength and life-cycle stages(Armstrong and Wright2007;Balto1999;Carrillo and Tan2006;Doganoglu and Wright2010;Mantena, Sankaranarayanan,and Viswanathan2007;Shapiro1999). Such exclusive contracts are relevant to market outcomes only when sellers would otherwise opt to multihome or to single-home on a competing platform.Scholars in this area debate the conditions under which the employment of such exclusive contracts has negative welfare consequences. Armstrong and Wright(2007)find that exclusive deals may actually promote a superior market outcome for both buy-ers and sellers under certain market conditions.Doganoglu and Wright(2010)find that exclusive deals are inefficient when offered by incumbentfirms as a tool to dominate a market in the face of entry,and the seller network is the primary beneficiary of such deals.Note that in our theoretical framework,as presented in the next section,we do not specifically distinguish differ-ent motivations for inducing single-homing through exclu-sive contracts,nor do we determine the beneficiaries of such actions.However,we consider the age and the mar-ket share of the platform as determinants of multihoming decisions and,in doing so,aim to generalize the condi-tions under which we can expect higher levels of multi-homing.In this respect,a study of special relevance to our present inquiry is that of Mantena,Sankaranarayanan,and Viswanathan(2007).Their analytical model examines the conditions under which single-homing can be observed and the impact of single-homing on industry outcomes,taking into account the typical high level of uncertainty buyers in two-sided markets face.Mantena,Sankaranarayanan,and Viswanathan’s work applies to the context of high technol-ogy and media markets,which share many features with our empirical context.Empirical studies relevant to our context are few in number and different in nature from our current inquiry. Rysman(2004)documents network benefits between buy-ers(consumers)and sellers(advertisers)of a platform (yellow pages).For simplicity reasons,he assumes that buyers single-home and sellers choose platforms only on the basis of the number of buyers of the platform.Corts 2In the section on robustness,we also consider an alternative measure of seller-platformfit that is based on application quality rather than application sales.and Lederman(2009)study the influence of platforms’installed base of buyers on the number of single-homed and multihomed applications published.They also study the influence of the number of applications on own and competing platform sales,which allows them to be thefirst to provide evidence of network benefits gained not only for a given platform but also across competing platforms. Binken and Stremersch(2009)are thefirst to show that superstar applications—applications of very high quality (i.e.,a quality rating≥90/100)that command a dispropor-tionately large payoff in application sales—affect platform sales beyond the effect of the total number of applications. Theyfind that the effects of single-homed and multihomed superstar applications on platform sales are similar. Using new metrics for seller-level and platform-level multihoming,we extend this empirical literature by (1)quantifying the effect of platform-level multihoming on platform sales across the entire collection of applica-tions and over all competing platforms in a direct manner, (2)theorizing and empirically documenting the moderat-ing role of market share and age of the platform on the relationship between platform-level multihoming and plat-form sales,and(3)theorizing and empirically documenting contrary effects of platform market share on seller-level multihoming,depending on the age of the platform.Theory DevelopmentIn this section,wefirst derive our theoretical expectations on the effect of platform-level multihoming on sales of the platform and the conditions that may influence this effect.In terms of conditions,we focus on the age and market share of the platform,because an increase in either may significantly lower the uncertainty that consumers face in their platform adoption decision.We expect that the greater this uncertainty,the more a platform needs a clearly differentiated positioning to be commercially successful. Then,we explore the effect of such conditions on seller-level multihoming on a given platform.Figure1provides a graphic overview of our conceptual framework and the hypotheses we posit.For the derivation of our hypotheses, we build on theories on differentiation and uncertainty in two-sided markets.The Influence of Platform-Level Multihoming on Platform SalesWhen a platform’s applications are multihomed on other platforms,the platform may not be able to differentiate itself through the applications of its network of sellers. Differentiation provides brands with greater resistance to competitive attacks(e.g.,Aaker1991;Carpenter,Glazer, and Nakamoto1994).Thus,in two-sided markets,in which buyers and sellers endow each other with network ben-efits,a platform for which few applications are multi-homed can achieve greater differentiation than a platform for which many applications are multihomed(Mantena, Sankaranarayanan,and Viswanathan2007).For example, the video game Tetris,which was single-homed on Game Boy,is credited for much of the Game Boy’s success(Allen 2003;Rowe1999).Platforms might not all be equally affected by a lack of differentiation from multihoming.We expect that nascentMultihoming in Two-Sided Markets/41FIGURE1Conceptual Frameworka Multihoming across all the seller’s applications for the platform.platforms(i.e.,platforms that have been introduced only recently)are more vulnerable to multihoming of their appli-cations than mature platforms.The level of buyers’uncer-tainty on a nascent platform is high initially,after which uncertainty fades as the platform matures.Under the high uncertainty characterizing nascent platforms,buyers’pref-erences for a platform can more easily tip in favor of a platform for which few of its applications are multihomed than a platform for which many of its applications are multihomed,keeping the number of applications constant (Mantena,Sankaranarayanan,and Viswanathan2007).As platforms mature,buyers’expectations about the ultimate success of the platform become more certain(Schilling 2002),and the need for differentiation through a platform’s applications decreases.We hypothesize the following: H1:There is a negative relationship between platform-level multihoming of applications and platform sales for nascentplatforms,which fades as platforms mature.Two-sided markets are known to“tip”in favor of the largest-share platform(Arthur1989).As a platform increas-ingly beats other platforms in terms of market share,other platform attributes(e.g.,the extent of platform-level multi-homing)become less important in buyers’platform choice.A large market share of a platform provides a clearer signal of the superior value the platform offers for buyers than attributes that are more difficult for a consumer to measure (Schilling1999),such as the number of applications for the platform that are multihomed.The important role of platform market share as a sig-nal for superior value alsofits priorfindings in differen-tiation theory.Carpenter and Nakamoto(1989)argue that greater similarity between brands hurts only the nondomi-nant brand and not the dominant brand.In the context of pioneering advantages,they attribute an overall perceptual distinctiveness to dominant brands that allows them to over-shadow similar,but smaller,competitors.Feinberg,Kahn, and McAlister(1992),who study variety seeking,alsofind that when consumer preferences remain constant,sharing more features with competing brands hurts small brands but does not hurt dominant brands.As we argued previ-ously,platform-level multihoming may lead to a lack of differentiation,which,according to this logic,would hurt dominant brands less than nondominant brands.Therefore, we hypothesize the following:H2:There is a negative relationship between platform-level multihoming of applications and platform sales for plat-forms with a small market share,which fades as platformsgain market share.In our empirical tests of the preceding hypotheses,we control for several other variables that may affect platform sales in addition to platform age and market share.3First, we control for the number of applications that are avail-able for the platform,which we expect to positively affect platform sales(Church and Gandal1993;Katz and Shapiro 1994).Second,we control for the number of platforms that compete with one petition may increase platform sales because it may benefit the growth of the industry(Agarwal and Bayus2002),or it may decrease 3Note that in the application context of this study,the correlation between market share and platform sales is low(.33)because of the high category sales growth over time.42/Journal of Marketing,November2011platform sales through platform switching (Carpenter and Lehmann 1985).Third,we control for the price of the plat-form,which we expect to negatively affect platform sales.Fourth,we include the number of superstar releases for the platform (Binken and Stremersch 2009).In addition,we control for seasonality in sales by including a December dummy,for inertia in sales by including the platform’s sales in the previous period,and for other time-invariant plat-form features by including platform dummies.In our case,such platform features can be technical attributes such as data width,clock speed,memory,the type of controller,the media device (e.g.,CD-ROM,DVD,Blu-ray),or the pos-sibility to access the Internet,as well as other aspects such as the brand name and credibility of the platform owner.Determinants of Seller-Level MultihomingSeller-level multihoming is the outcome of the decision of platform owners to provide incentives to lower the level of seller-level multihoming and the decision of sellers on the level of seller-level multihoming,given such incentives.We theorize on the effects of age and market share of the platform and the seller–platform fit on the platform owner and seller decisions,and,in turn,on the level of seller-level multihoming.As H 1predicts,when a platform is mature,the platform owner has little need to offer sellers incentives to discour-age them from multihoming.Owners of nascent platforms may have a greater need to offer sellers such incentives.These arguments may explain the increase in multihoming over the life cycle of a platform (as illustrated in Figure 2).FIGURE 2Multihoming for All Platforms (July 1995–April 2008)0 .1 .2 .3.4 .5.6ii.7.8 .9J a n -08A u g -07M a r -07O c t -06M a y -06D e c -05J u l -05F e b -05S e p -04A p r -04N o v -03J u n -03J a n -03A u g -02M a r -02O c t -01M a y -01D e c -00J u l -00F e b -00S e p -99A p r -99N o v -98J u n -98J a n -98A u g -97M a r -97O c t -96M a y -96D e c -95J u l -95Beyond this direct effect,platform age may also inter-act with the market share of the platform.The owner of a mature platform with a large market share will have an even lower need to offer incentives to discourage sellers from multihoming than the owner of a mature platform with a small market share,because high-share platforms are hurt less by seller-level multihoming than low-share plat-forms.Therefore,as the market share of a mature platform increases,we expect the platform owner to offer sellers fewer incentives that discourage them from multihoming.At the same time,if a small-share,mature platform offers such incentives,sellers may still accept them,despite the low market share of the platform because such platforms may still represent sizeable buyer networks in absolute numbers (Mantena,Sankaranarayanan,and Viswanathan 2007).In summary,the incidence of seller-level multihoming among mature platforms likely increases with market share.For nascent platforms,the opposite is true.In the early stage of the life cycle of a new platform in a two-sided market,buyers are still largely undecided,and the user base is still small (see Mantena,Sankaranarayanan,and Viswanathan 2007;Schilling 2002;Stremersch et al.2007).Nascent platforms are therefore likely to offer sellers incen-tives to discourage them from multihoming because the lack of differentiation caused by multihoming may substan-tially hurt such platforms.Sellers will more easily accept such incentives from owners of platforms with a greater market share because their higher market share serves as a signal of superior value to sellers.Therefore,we expect to find a lower incidence of seller-level multihoming forMultihoming in Two-Sided Markets /43nascent platforms with greater market shares(compared with nascent platforms with lower market shares).We hypothesize the following:H3:The relationship between the market share of a platform among buyers and the extent of seller-level multihomingof applications for that platform is(a)negative for nascentplatforms and(b)positive for mature platforms. Next,we theorize that a betterfit between a seller’s applications and the characteristics of the platform or of the platform’s buyers’network(Choi2007)increases the platform owner’s inclination to make high payments to the seller to reduce the degree to which its applications are multihomed.At the same time,the seller is more likely to accept such payments from the owner of a platform with which it shows a betterfit than from the owner of a plat-form with which it shows a worsefit.We use the prior sales success of the seller’s applications among the buyers of the platform as an indicator of seller–platformfit.We hypothesize the following:H4:Seller-level multihoming increases as seller–platformfit decreases.Note that a potential counterargument may lie in a coop-eration dilemma known in the economics literature as the “holdup problem.”This problem emerges in situations in which cooperation between two market players(in our case,the platform owner and the seller)is the most effi-cient strategy,and yet the players refrain from cooperation because they do not want to give the other party increased bargaining power(Edlin and Reichelstein1996;Schwarz and Takhteyev2010).However,in our context,this holdup problem is unlikely to occur,because the exclusivity agree-ments between sellers and platform owners are made for each application separately,often before the application is developed.In our empirical tests of the H3and H4,we again control for the number of applications that already exist for the platform,inertia in multihoming decisions,and the characteristics of the platforms that are time-invariant (see previous discussion)using platform dummies.DataWe test our hypotheses using data from the video game console industry.This sectionfirst describes this research context and our data collection procedures,after which it turns to the operationalization and description of the mea-sures we employ.Research Context:The Video GameConsole IndustryThe video game console industry dates back to the early 1970s.In1972,the television maker Magnavox introduced Odyssey,thefirst home video game console.The system came with12games,including versions of tennis and Ping-Pong,and more than100,000game consoles were sold by the end of1972.Since then,seven sequential generations of game consoles have been introduced,one everyfive to six years.Each generation is typically characterized by a superior technology,often with new and superior console accessories,and consists of a small number of competing,incompatible video game consoles and a collection of game titles.In thefirst generations of home video game con-soles,the games were typically developed and published by the console owners.Over time,platforms(i.e.,consoles) and applications(i.e.,games)in the video game industry became increasingly separated,with large publishers spe-cializing in games,without a footprint in console manufac-turing(e.g.,Electronic Arts).The popularity of video game consoles has grown rapidly in the past two decades,with more than55million seventh-generation game consoles sold in the United States as of March2010(Digital Digest2010).Recently,playing video games was rated the top fun entertainment activ-ity by American households,outpacing watching televi-sion,surfing the Internet,reading books,and going to or renting movies(Interactive Digital Software Association 2001).ACNielsen’s2005study“Benchmarking the Active Gamer”shows that the demographic of gamers widened between2000and2005,with more women playing and an emerging market of males in the25-to34-year age range. This study also found that gamers spent more time(25% of their leisure time)playing games(BusinessWeek2005). The video game console market is well suited for test-ing the implications of multihoming in two-sided markets. First,this market is often cited as the canonical exam-ple of a two-sided market(Clements and Ohashi2005; Shankar and Bayus2003).Second,there is sufficient vari-ation in this market,both over time and across consoles, in multihoming,the number of applications,and platform sales.Third,the business of publishing video games today is similar to the publishing of DVDs and other entertain-ment products.Our data cover the sales of12home video game con-soles from three consecutive generations(i.e.,generations 5,6,and7),including unit sales and quality ratings for all games sold for the analyzed systems(4230titles)in the United States over154consecutive months starting from July1995.The consoles include Sega Saturn,Sony PlayStation,Nintendo64,3DO Multiplayer,Atari Jaguar, Sega Dreamcast,Sony PlayStation2,Nintendo GameCube, Microsoft Xbox,Microsoft Xbox360,Sony PlayStation3, and Nintendo Wii.Thefifth video game console generation is known as the 32-/64-bit generation.This generation lasted approximately from1993to2002.The three dominating consoles of the fifth generation are Sega Saturn(introduced in May1995), Sony PlayStation(introduced in September1995),and Nin-tendo64(introduced in September1996).Other consoles that were part of this generation and are covered in our data are the3DO Multiplayer and Atari Jaguar,but they had a much lower sales level and no significant impact on the structure of the market.The sixth video game console generation,also known as the128-bit generation,refers to video game consoles that were introduced between1999and2001.Platforms of the sixth generation include Sega’s Dreamcast(introduced in September1999),Sony’s PlayStation2(introduced in Octo-ber2000),and the Nintendo GameCube and Microsoft’s Xbox(both introduced in November2001).The consoles of the sixth generation showed great similarity in terms of their technological characteristics.The seventh video game console generation(the current generation)includes game consoles that have been released44/Journal of Marketing,November2011。

作者、书名、出版社、出版年份、目录Thomas A．Pugel. International Economics(15th). Renmin University of China p ress. 2012-12CONTENTSChapter 1 International Economics Is DifferentFour ControversiesEconomics and the Nation-StateThe Scheme of This BookPART ONE THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADEChapter 2 The Basic Theory Using Demand and SupplyFour Questions about TradeA Look AheadDemand and SupplyCase Study Trade Is ImportantGlobal Crisis The Trade Mini-Collapse of 2009Two National Markets and the Opening of TradeChapter 3 Why Everybody Trades: Comparative Advantage 33Adam Smith’s Theory of Absolute AdvantageCase Study Mercantilism: Older Than Smith—and Alive TodayRicardo’s Theory of Comparative AdvantageRicardo’s Constant Costs and the Producti on-Possibility CurveFocus on Labor Absolute Advantage Does MatterExtension What If Trade Doesn’t Balance?Chapter 4 Trade: Factor Availability and Factor Proportions Are KeyProduction with Increasing Marginal CostsCommunity Indifference CurvesProduction and Consumption TogetherFocus on China The Opening of Trade and China’s Shift Out of AgricultureThe Gains from TradeTrade Affects Production and ConsumptionWhat Determines the Trade Pattern?The Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O) TheoryChapter 5 Who Gains and Who Loses from Trade?Who Gains and Who Loses within a CountryThree Implications of the H–O TheoryExtension A Factor-Ratio ParadoxDoes Heckscher–Ohlin Explain Actual Trade Patterns?Case Study The Leontief ParadoxWhat Are the Export-Oriented and Import-Competing Factors?Focus on China China’s Exports and ImportsDo Factor Prices Equalize Internationally?Focus on Labor U.S. Jobs and Foreign Trade 86Chapter 6 Scale Economies, Imperfect Competition, and TradeScale EconomiesIntra-Industry TradeMonopolistic Competition and TradeExtension The Individual Firm in MonopolisticOligopoly and TradeExtension The Gravity Model of TradeChapter 7 Growth and TradeBalanced versus Biased GrowthGrowth in Only One FactorChanges in the Country’s Willingness to TradeCase Study The Dutch Disease and DeindustrializationEffects on the Country’s Terms of TradeTechnology and TradeFocus on Labor Trade, Technology, and U.S. WagesPART TWO TRADE POLICYChapter 8 Analysis of a TariffGlobal Governance WTO and GATT: Tariff SuccessA Preview of ConclusionsThe Effect of a Tariff on Domestic ProducersThe Effect of a Tariff on Domestic ConsumersThe Tariff as Government RevenueThe Net National Loss from a TariffExtension The Effective Rate of ProtectionCase Study They Tax Exports, TooThe Terms-of-Trade Effect and a Nationally Optimal TariffChapter 9 Nontariff Barriers to ImportsTypes of Nontariff Barriers to ImportsThe Import QuotaGlobal Governance The WTO: Beyond TariffsGlobal Crisis Dodging ProtectionismExtension A Domestic Monopoly Prefers a QuotaVoluntary Export Restraints (VERs)Other Nontariff BarriersCase Study VERs: Two ExamplesCase Study Carrots Are Fruit, Snails Are Fish, and X-Men Are Not HumansHow Big Are the Costs of Protection?International Trade DisputesFocus on China China’s First Decade in the WTOChapter 10 Arguments for and against ProtectionThe Ideal World of First BestThe Realistic World of Second BestPromoting Domestic Production or EmploymentThe Infant Industry ArgumentFocus on Labor How Much Does It Cost to Protect a Job?The Dying Industry Argument and Adjustment AssistanceThe Developing Government (Public Revenue) ArgumentOther Arguments for Protection: Non=economic ObjectivesThe Politics of Protection The Basic Elements of the Political-Economic Analysis Case Study How Sweet It Is (or Isn’t)Chapter 11 Pushing ExportsDumpingReacting to Dumping: What Should a Dumpee Think?Actual Antidumping Policies: What Is Unfair?Case Study Antidumping in ActionProposals for ReformExport SubsidiesWTO Rules on SubsidiesShould the Importing Country Impose Countervailing Duties?Case Study Agriculture Is AmazingStrategic Export Subsidies Could Be GoodGlobal Governance Dogfight at the WTOChapter 12 Trade Blocs and Trade BlocksTypes of Economic BlocsIs Trade Discrimination Good or Bad?The Basic Theory of Trade Blocs: Trade Creation and Trade DiversionOther Possible Gains from a Trade BlocThe EU ExperienceCase Study Postwar Trade Integration in EuropeNorth America Becomes a BlocTrade Blocs among Developing CountriesTrade EmbargoesChapter 13 Trade and the EnvironmentIs Free Trade Anti-Environment?Is the WTO Anti-Environment?Global Governance Dolphins, Turtles, and the WTOThe Specificity Rule AgainA Preview of Policy PrescriptionsTrade and Domestic PollutionTrans-border PollutionGlobal Environmental ChallengesChapter 14 Trade Policies for Developing CountriesWhich Trade Policy for Developing Countries?Are the Long-Run Price Trends against Primary Producers?Case Study Special Challenges of TransitionInternational Cartels to Raise Primary-Product PricesImport-Substituting Industrialization (ISI)Exports of Manufactures to Industrial CountriesChapter 15 Multinationals and Migration: International Factor MovementsForeign Direct InvestmentMultinational EnterprisesFDI: History and Current PatternsWhy Do Multinational Enterprises Exist?Taxation of Mul tinational Enterprises’ProfitsCase Study CEMEX: A Model Multinational from an Unusual PlaceMNEs and International TradeShould the Home Country Restrict FDI Outflows?Should the Host Country Restrict FDI Inflows?Focus on China China as a Host CountryMigrationHow Migration Affects Labor MarketsShould the Sending Country Restrict Emigration?Should the Receiving Country Restrict Immigration?Case Study Are Immigrants a Fiscal Burden?APPENDIXESA The Web and the Library: International Numbers and Other InformationB Deriving Production-Possibility CurvesC Offer CurvesD The Nationally Optimal Tariff周瑞琪. International Trade Practice. University of International Business and Economics press. 2011.9CONTENTSChapter One General Introduction（第一章导论）1.1 Reasons for International Trade （国际间贸易的起因）1.2 Differences between International Trade and Domestic Trade （国际贸易与国内贸易的差异）1.3 Classification of International Trade（国际贸易的分类）1.4 Export and Import Procedures（进出口贸易的程序）1.5 Overview of This Book （本书的基本内容）Summary（总结）Key Terms（主要术语）Abbreviations（缩略语）Exercises（练习）Specimens（单证样本）Chapter Two International Trade Terms（第二章国际贸易术语）2.1 Three Sets of Rules （三种贸易术语的解释规则）2.2 Basics of Incoterms 2010 （2010年国际贸易术语解释通则基本概念）2.3 Application Issues（贸易术语在使用中应注意的问题）2.4 Determinants of Choice of Trade Terms （贸易术语选用的决定因素）Summary（总结）Key Terms（主要术语）Abbreviations（缩略语）Exercises（练习）Chapter Three Export Price（第三章出口商品的价格）3.1 Expression of Export Price（出口价格的表达）3.2 Pricing Considerations（影响定价的因素）3.3 Calculation of Price（价格的计算）3.4 Understanding the Price（价格的评估）3.5 Communication of Price（价格的沟通）Summary（总结）Key Terms（主要术语）Abbreviations（缩略语）Exercises（练习）Chapter Four Terms of Commodity（第四章商品条款）4.1 Name of Commodity （商品的名称）4.2 Specifying Quality（商品的品质）4.3 Measuring Quantity（商品的数量）4.4 Packing and Marking（商品的包装及标志）Summary（总结）Key Terms（主要术语）Abbreviations（缩略语）Exercises（练习）Chapter Five Cargo Transportation（第五章国际货物运输）5.1 Ocean Transportation （海洋运输）5.2 Other Modes of Transportation （其他运输方式）5.3 Transportation Documents（运输单据）5.4 Shipment Clause in the Sales Contract（销售合同中的装运条款）Summary（总结）Key Terms（主要术语）Abbreviations（缩略语）Exercises（练习）Specimens（单证样本）Chapter Six Cargo Transportation Insurance（第六章货物运输保险）6.1 Fundamental Principles of Cargo Insurance（货物保险的基本原则）6.2 Marine Risks and Losses（海上风险和损失）6.3 Coverage of Marine Cargo Insurance of CIC（我国海上货物保险范围）6.4 Coverage of Marine Cargo Insurance of ICC（协会货物保险范围）6.5 Other Types of Cargo Insurance（其他货物保险的种类）6.6 Procedures of Cargo Insurance（货物保险程序）6.7 Insurance Terms in the Sales Contract（销售合同中的保险条款）Summary（总结）Key Terms（主要术语）Abbreviations（缩略语）Exercises（练习）Specimens（单证样本）Chapter Seven International Payments（第七章国际货款支付）7.1 Issues in Concern（影响支付条件的因素）7.2 Paying Instruments（支付工具）7.3 Remittance（汇付）7.4 Collection（托收）7.5 Basics of Letter of Credit（信用证基础知识）7.6 Types of Documentary Credit（跟单信用证的种类）7.7 Letter of Guarantee（L/G）（保函）7.8 Export Financing（出口融资）7.9 Payment Problems（支付中出现的问题）Summary（总结）Key Terms（主要术语）Abbreviations（缩略语）Exercises（练习）Specimens（单证样本）Chapter Eight Export Documentation（第八章出口单证）8.1 Significance of Documentation（单证的重要性）8.2 Basic Requirements for Documentation（单证的基本要求）8.3 Prerequisites of Documentation（制单的依据）8.4 Export Documents（出口单证的种类）8.5 Clause Concerning Documents in the Sales Contract（销售合同中有关单证的条款）Summary（总结）Key Terms（主要术语）Abbreviations（缩略语）Exercises（练习）Specimens（单证样本）Chapter Nine Inspection, Claim, Force Majeure and Arbitration（第九章商检、索赔、不可抗力和仲裁）9.1 Commodity Inspection（商品检验）9.2 Disputes and Claims（争议和索赔）9.3 Force Majeure（不可抗力）9.4 Arbitration（仲裁）Summary（总结）Key Terms（主要术语）Abbreviations（缩略语）Exercises（练习）Key to Exercises（练习答案）Glossary（词汇表）Appendix 1INCOTERMS 2010 （FOB, CFR, CIF）（附录12010年国际贸易术语解释通则（FOB，CFR，CIF））Appendix 2CISG 1980 （Part II）（附录2联合国国际货物销售合同公约1980（第二部分）) References （参考书目）帅建林. International Trade Practice. University of International Business and Economics press. 2007.9CONTENTSPart 1 OverviewChapter 1 Introduction to International TradeChapter 2 International Trade PolicyChapter 3 Trade Bloc and Trade BlockChapter 4 WTO :A Navigation GuidePart 2 Terms of International TradeChapter 5 International Trade TermsChapter Terms of CommodityChapter International Cargo TransportChapter 8 Cargo InsuranceChapter 9 Terms of PriceChapter 10 International Payment and SettlementChapter 11 Claims, Force Majeure and ArbitrationPart 3 International Trade ProcedureChapter 12 Launching a Profitable TransactionChapter 13 Business Negotiation and Establishment of ContractChapter 14 Exporting ElementsChapter 15 Importing ElementsChapter 16 DocumentationPart 4 Trade FormsChapter 17 Agency, Distribution and ConsignmentChapter 18 TendersChapter 19 Counter TradeChapter 20 Futures TradingChapter 21 E-CommerceAppendix Glossary of International Trade Terms with English-Chinese InterpretationsBibliographyPaul R.Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld. International Economics:Theory andPolicy,8E. Tsinghua University press. 2011-11Contents前言第1章绪论第1部分国际贸易理论第2章世界贸易：概览第3章劳动生产率和比较优势：李嘉图模型第4章资源、比较优势和收入分配第5章标准贸易模型第6章规模经济、不完全竞争和国际贸易第7章国际要素流动第2部分国际贸易政策第8章贸易政策工具第9章贸易政策中的政治经济学第10章发展中国家的贸易政策第11章贸易政策中的争论数学附录第4章附录要素比例模型第5章附录贸易下的世界经济第6章附录垄断竞争模模型张素芳，International trade: theory and practice. University of International Business & Economics Press, Beijing, 2010contentsSection I. International Trade Theory and PolicyCHAPTER 1.INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE1.The Reasons for International Trade1.1. Resources reasons1.2. Economic reasons1.3. Other reasons2. The Differences between International Trade and Domestic Trade'.'2.1. More plex context2.2. More difficult and risky2.3. Higher skills required3.Basic Concepts Relating to International Trade3.1. Visible trade and invisible trade3.2. Favorable balance of trade and unfavorable balance oft rade3.3. General trade system and special trade system3.4. Volume of international trade and quantum of international trade3.5. Commodity position of international trade3.6. Geographical position of international trade3.7. Degree of dependence on foreign tradeCHAPTER 2.CLASSICAL TRADE THEORIES1.Mercantilism1.1. The development of mercantilist thought1.2. The mercantilist economic system1.3. Economic policies pursued by the mercantilists1.4. Discussions2.David Hume's Challenge to Mercantilism2.1. Assumptions of price-specie=flow mechanism2.2. The price-specie-flow mechanism3.Adam Smith's Theory of Absolute Advantage3.1. Assumptions of Adam Smith's theory of absolute advantage3.2. Challenge to Mercantilism3.3. Example4.David Ricardo's Theory of Comparative Advantage4.1. The concept of parative advantage4.2. Example4.3. Analysis of the theory of parative advantage by using modemtools. CHAPTER 3.NEOCLASSICAL TRADE THEORIES.1.Gains from Trade in Neoclassical Trade Theory1.1. Increasing opportunity costs on the PPF1.2. General equilibrium and gains in autarky1.3. General equilibrium and gains after the introduction of international trade ...2.Reciprocal Demand Theory2.1. A country's offer curve2.2. Trading equilibrium2.3. Measurement of terms of trade3.Factor Endowment Theory3.1. Factor intensity in production3.2. Factor endowments, factor prices, and parative advantage3.3. Assumptions of the factor proportions theory.,3.4. The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem.:3.5. An example to illustrate H-O theorem.3.6. The factor price equalization theorem:3.7. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem4.The Leontief Paradox——An Empirical Test of the Factor Proportions Theory 4.1. The Leontief paradox.-4.2. Suggested explanations for the Leontief Paradox and related theories CHAPTER 4.POST-HECKSHER-OHLIN THEORIES OF TRADE1.The Product Cycle Theory1.1. The imitation lag hypothesis1.2. The product cycle theory2.The Linder Theory2.1. Assumptions of the Linder theory2.2. Trade es in the overlapping ranges of products ophistication.:3.Intra-Industry Trade Theory3.1. Explanations of intra-industry trade3.2. Measurement of intra-industry tradeCHAPTER 5.IMPORT PROTECTION POLICY: TARIFFS1.Types of Import Tariffs1.1. In terms of the means of collection1.2. In terms of the different tariff rates applied1.3. In terms of special purposes for collection2.The Effects of Import Tariffs2.1. Concepts of consumer surplus and producer surplus2.2. The welfare effects of import tariffs3.Measurement of Import Tariffs3.1. The 'height' of import tariffs3.2. Nominal versus effective tariff ratesCHAPTER 6.IMPORT PROTECTION POLICY: NON-TARIFF BARRIERS''1.Forms of Non-tariff Barriers.1.1. Quantity control measures1.2. Price control measures1.3. Para-tariff measures1.4. Finance measures1.5. Anti-petitive measures.,.1.6. Miscellaneous measures2.Effects of Non-tariff Barriers2.1. The effects of an import quota2.2. The effects of a subsidy to an import-peting industryCHAPTER 7.EXPORT PROMOTION AND OTHER POLICIES1.Export Subsidy and Production Subsidy1.1. Export subsidy and its effects1.2. Production subsidy and its effects.2.Other Export Promotion Policies2.1. Devaluation of home currency.2.2. Commodity dumping2.3. Bonded warehouse2.4. Special trade zone2.5. Export promotion programs3.Export Restrictions and Import Promotion Policies3.1. Export restrictions policies3.2. Import promotion policies4.Trade Sanctions4.1. Introduction to trade sanctions4.2. Effectiveness of trade sanctionsCHAPTER 8.ARGUMENTS AGAINST FREE TRADE1.Traditional Arguments against Free Trade1.1. Infant industry argument.1.2. Terms of trade argument1.3. Balance of trade argument1.4. Tariff to reduce aggregate unemployment argument1.5. Fair petition argument1.6. National security argument2.New Protectionism2.1. Tariff to extract foreign monopoly profit2.2. Export subsidy in duopoly3.The Political Economy of Trade Policy3.1. Median voter model3.2. Collective action theory.3.3. Contribution in political campaignsCHAPTER 9.REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATIONof Regional Economic Integration1.1. Preferential tariff arrangement1.2. Free trade area1.3. Customs union1.4. Common market.1.5. Economic union2.The Static and Dynamic Effects of Regional Economic Integration2.1. Static effects of regional economic integration2.2. Dynamic effects of regional economic integration3.Economic Integration in Europe, North America and Asia3.1. Economic integration in Europe……………………………………Chapter 10 International Cargo Transportation InsuranceChapter 11 International Trade PaymentChapter 12 Inspection,Claim,Force Majeure and ArbitrationChapter 13 Trade Negotiation and Formation of the ContractChapter 14 Implementation of the Contract丹尼斯·R·阿普尔亚德 & 小艾尔弗雷德·J·菲尔德 & 史蒂文·L·科布.国际贸易.中国人民大学出版社. 2012-7第1章国际经济学的世界第一部分古典贸易理论第2章早期的国际贸易理论：由重商主义向大卫·李嘉图的古典贸易理论的演进第3章大卫·李嘉图的古典贸易理论和比较优势第4章对古典贸易模型的扩充及验证第二部分新贸易理论第5章新古典贸易理论——基本分析工具的介绍第6章新古典贸易理论中的贸易利得第7章贸易提供曲线和贸易条件第8章贸易的基础：要素禀赋理论和赫克歇尔俄林模型第9章要素禀赋理论的实证分析第三部分贸易理论的扩展第10章后赫克歇尔俄林贸易理论与产业内贸易第11章经济增长与国际贸易第12章国际要素流动第四部分贸易政策第13章贸易政策工具第14章贸易政策的影响第15章对干涉主义贸易政策的争论第16章经济的政治因素与美国的对外贸易政策第17章经济一体化第18章国际贸易与发展中国家参考文献当我被上帝造出来时，上帝问我想在人间当一个怎样的人，我不假思索的说，我要做一个伟大的世人皆知的人。

给下面一篇文章的每一段概括大意。

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31. F abundance and Price RisingThe long years of food shortage in this country have suddenly giveway to apparent abundance. Stores and shops are choked with food. Rationing (定量供应) is virtually suspended (暂停), and overseas suppliers (供应商) havebeen asked to hold back deliveries. Y et, instead of joy, there is wide-spreaduneasiness and confusion. Why do food prices keep on rising when there seems tobe so much more food about? Is the abundance only temporary, or has it come tostay? Does it mean that we need to think less now about producing more food athome? No one knows what to expect.32. ReaThe recent growth of export surpluses on the world food market hascertainly been unexpectedly great, partly because a strange sequence of twosuccessful grain harvests in North America is now being followed by a third.Most of Britain’s overseas suppliers of meat, too, are offering more this yearand home production has also risen.33. E of Food SituationBut the effect of all this on the food situation in this country hasbeen made worse by a simultaneous rise in food prices, due chiefly to thegradual cutting down of government support for food. The shops are overstocked(存货过多) with food out only because there is more food available, but alsobecause people, frightened by high prices, are buying less of it.34. Fa of World PricesMoreover, the rise in domestic prices has come at a time when worldpries have begun to fall with the result that imported food, with the exceptionof grain, is often cheaper than the home-produced variety. And now grainprices, too, are falling. Consumers are beginning to ask why they should not beenabled to benefit form this trend.35. The Res of Farmers FearThe significance of these developments is not lost on farmers. Theolder generation have seen it all happen before. Despite the present price andmarket guarantees, farmers fear they are about to be squeezed between cheapfood imports and a shrinking home market. Present production is running at 51per cent above pre-war levels, and the government has called for an expansionto 60 per cent by 1956; but repeated Ministerial (内阁的) advice is carryinglittle weight and the expansion programme is not working very well. 第五部分阅读理解(120分)Passage 1There are striking differences between financial markets on theContinent of Europe on the one hand, and in Britain on the other. In Britain,the market is really the City of London. It is a free market: and it controlsmost of the flow of savings to investment. On the Continent, either a few banksor government institutions dominate the money markets. In France and Italy, forexample, government bureaucrats (官僚) direct the flow of funds to suit theireconomic plans. In Germany the flow is directed by the all-powerful banks. InBritain there is more free interplay (相互作用) of market forces and far fewerregulations, rules and "red tape". A French banker summed it up this way : " Onthe Continent you can’t do anything unless you’ve been old you can; in Englandon the other hand you can do everythin g as long as you haven’t been told notto."There are many basic reasons for these differences. One is thatContinental savers (储蓄者) tend to prefer gold, cash or short-term assets.They invest only 10% of their savings in institutions like pension funds orinsurance companies. But in Britain 50% of savings goes to them, and they, inturn, invest directly in equity (证券) market. A far lower proportion ofsavings is put in the banks in the form of liquid assets than on the Continent.Continent governments intervene directly or through the banks to collectsaving together and transform them into medium or long-term loans forinvestment. The equity market is largely by-passed. On the Continent economicplanning tends to be far more centralized (把……集中起来) than in Britain. In Britain it is possible to influence decisions affecting the country’s economyfrom within the City. It attracts a skilled and highly qualified work force. InFrance, on the other hand, an intelligent young man who wants a career infinance would probably find the civil service more attractive.In Britain the market or more accurately, money tends to be regardedas an end in itself. On the Continent it is regarded as a means to an end;investment in the economy. To British eyes continental systems with thepossible exception of the Dutch seem bureaucratic (官僚主义的), slow andinefficient. But there is one outstanding fact the City should not overlook.Britain’s growth rates and levels investment over the last ten years have beenmuch lower than on the Continent. There are many reasons of this, but the Citymust take part of the blame. If it is accepted that the basic function of afinancial market is to supply industry and commerce with finance in order toachieve desired rates of growth, it can be said that by concentrating on themarket for its own sake the City has tended to forget that basic function.36. What is the best title for the passage?○A. Reasons behind the difference.○B. Banking and Finance: a Basic Difference in Attitudes.○C. Monetary Policy in Britain.○D. The European Continent and Britain.37. What seems to be the most basic reason for this difference?○A. The British tend to regard money as an end, whereas Continental Europeanconsider it a means to an end.○B. The British invest only 10% of their savings in pension funds.○C. On the Continent you can’t do anything unless you have b een told you can.○D. Intelligent young men who want a career tend to go to civil service in theContinent.38. According to the passage, the Dutch way of finance and banking ________.○A. is similar to that of the French○B. makes no d ifference whatever system it follows○C. is perhaps resembling that of the British○D. has a low efficiency39. The word "striking" in Line 1 means ________.○A. beating○B. surplus○C. noticeable○D. seemingly40. In what way does the Continental system seem better?○A. The Continent maintains a higher growth rate and levels of investment.○B. It has less proportions of savings in the form of liquid assets.○C. It attracts intelligent young men.○D. It functi ons properly despite the fact that the British discount it. Passage 2Insurance in respect of the property will be effected by the Societyin accordance with the Rules and the mortgage conditions with such insurancecompanies as the Societyinsurance companies and of the terms offered by their policies, and places insurance with many companies who are able to provide the cover which and if soplease contact immediately the Branch Office to which you submitted your application for loan, and so long as that company and its terms are acceptable to the Society cover will be arranged accordingly. If you should suggest a company and it is not one with which the Society does business you will beinformed and offered a choice of other companies. You may request a change of insurance company at any time during the life of the mortgage. If your mortgage is under the endowment ( 损赠 ) scheme or supported by an insurance guarantee orif the documents of title specify the company to be used it may not be possible to accept your choice.The initial sum insured will be the figure shown under theheading "Amount of Property Insurance" in the Details of Loan. This figure is the amount recommended by the Society’s valuer ( 估价者 ), as his estimate of thereplacement cost of the building at the date of valuation, unless some other amount has been agreed in writing between you and the Society. No guarantee isgiven or implied that the amount of insurance will cover complete loss.You are reminded that the market value of your property bears norelationship to the cost of replacement. The amount for which property is insured therefore repr /plj/esent not less than the cost, at the time of repair orreplacement, of rebuilding all the property covered in the same materials, form, style and condition as when it is new. It should also include any architects, surveyors and legal fees which may be payable, and any costs which may be incurred in complying with the requirements of the Local authority and in removing debris ( 碎片 ), etc. The term "property" includes domesticoutbuilding, garages, walls, landlords’ fixtures ( 固定装置 ) and furniture, etc.But excludes the value of the land.The market value of house is therefore likely to be less than thecost of rebuilding, especially if the property is elderly ( 年久的 ). Even if theproperty is recently built, the work involved in reinstatement ( 复原 ) will bemore expensive than the building cost which can be achieved by a builder building on an estate basis.41. The passage appears to be from __________.○A. an advertisement○B. an information booklet○C. a newspaper artic le○D. a formal speech42. The tone of this passage could best be described as ___________.○A. academic○B. formal○C. light-hearted○D. subjective43. According to the passage if the customer suggests an insurance company________.○A. it is impossible to change that company later on○B. the Building Society will provide a list of alternative companies○C. the B /lmsd/uilding Society will not accept responsibility for the policy○D. the Building Society may not be able to agree to that company44. The passage states that when you insure your property _________.○A. you should not take the land value into account○B. you should use the market value as a guide○C. yo u should take the advice of your Local Authority○D. garages and garden sheds are not usually included45. The passage implies that rebuilding a property costs more than its marketvalue __________.○A. only if the property is old○B. p articularly if the property is new○C. whatever the age of the property○D. because of rising building costs第六部分完形填空 (30分)根据短文在空白处填上适当的单词，该单词的第一个字母已经给出。

一级市场二级市场英语The primary market and the secondary market are both crucial elements of the financial markets, playing pivotal roles in facilitating the buying and selling of securities and assets. In this article, we will delve into the definitions, functions, and differences between these two markets in the context of the global financial landscape.Introduction to the Primary MarketThe primary market, also known as the new issue market, is where companies issue new securities, such as stocks, bonds, or any other financial instruments, for the first time to the public. This is done through an initial public offering (IPO) or a private placement. In an IPO, a company offers its shares to the public for the first time, allowing investors to purchase a stake in the company. On the other hand, in a private placement, the company sells its securities directly to institutional investors or high-net-worth individuals.The primary market plays a critical role in helping companies raise capital to fund their operations, expansion, or other activities. It gives companies the opportunity to access a large pool of potential investors and raise funds to support theirgrowth strategies. Additionally, the primary market provides investors with the chance to invest in new companies and participate in their success.Introduction to the Secondary MarketThe secondary market, also known as the stock market or the aftermarket, is where existing securities are bought and sold among investors without the involvement of the issuing company. In this market, investors trade securities with each other, allowing them to easily buy or sell their investments on an exchange or over-the-counter (OTC) platform. The secondary market provides liquidity to investors by offering a platform for buying and selling securities after they have been issued in the primary market.The secondary market serves several key functions, including providing liquidity to investors, determining the prices of securities through supply and demand dynamics, and enabling investors to adjust their investment portfolios based on changing market conditions. It also plays a crucial role in facilitating price discovery and efficient capital allocation in the financial markets.Differences Between the Primary Market and the Secondary MarketThere are several key differences between the primary market and the secondary market that distinguish them in terms of their functions and operations.1. Purpose- Primary Market: The primary market is used by companies to raise capital by issuing new securities to investors.- Secondary Market: The secondary market allows investors to buy and sell existing securities among themselves without the involvement of the issuing company.2. Participants- Primary Market: The primary market involves issuers, such as companies or governments, and investors who purchase the newly issued securities.- Secondary Market: The secondary market involves investors, such as individuals, institutional investors, and traders, who buy and sell existing securities with each other.3. Timeframe- Primary Market: The primary market deals with the issuance of new securities for the first time to the public.- Secondary Market: The secondary market deals with the buying and selling of existing securities that have already been issued in the primary market.4. Pricing- Primary Market: In the primary market, the price of securities is determined by the issuing company based on factors such as market demand, financial performance, and valuation.- Secondary Market: In the secondary market, the price of securities is determined by supply and demand dynamics among investors, leading to fluctuating prices based on market conditions.5. Regulation- Primary Market: The primary market is subject to regulatory requirements that govern the issuance of new securities, such as disclosure rules, registration processes, and compliance with securities laws.- Secondary Market: The secondary market is also subject to regulatory oversight that ensures fair and transparent trading practices, such as market regulations, trading rules, and investor protections.ConclusionBoth the primary market and the secondary market are integral components of the financial markets, each serving distinct purposes in the process of buying and selling securities. While the primary market facilitates the issuance of new securities by companies to raise capital, the secondary market enables investors to trade existing securities among themselves. Understanding the roles, functions, and differences between these two markets is essential for investors, companies, and regulators to navigate the complexities of the global financial landscape effectively.。

从事二级市场交易英语作文Trading in the secondary market can be quite exciting. It's like a rollercoaster ride, with prices going up and down constantly.One minute you could be making a huge profit, and the next you could be facing a big loss. It's all about taking risks and being able to adapt quickly to changing market conditions.The key to success in the secondary market is to stay informed and keep a close eye on market trends. You need to be able to analyze data and make quick decisions based on your analysis.Emotions can often get in the way of rational decision-making in the secondary market. It's important to keep a level head and not let fear or greed dictate your actions.Some people thrive in the fast-paced environment of thesecondary market, while others find it too stressful. It's definitely not for everyone, but for those who enjoy the thrill of trading, it can be a highly rewarding experience.In the end, trading in the secondary market is all about taking calculated risks and being able to adapt to changing circumstances. It's not always easy, but for those who are willing to put in the time and effort, thepotential rewards can be significant.。

写踢足球用现在进行时英语作文一百词全文共6篇示例，供读者参考篇1I am currently kicking the soccer ball across the field. My team, the Red Rockets, is playing against our biggest rivals, the Blue Bombers. The game is really intense and we are all running up and down the field, chasing after that round ball.My friend Jake is dribbling the ball down the left side of the field. He is juking past the other team's defenders with his amazing footwork. Two Blue Bombers are closing in on him though, so he kicks a crisp pass over to me near the center of the field.I am trapping the ball with the inside of my foot to control it.A big kid named Timmy from the other team is sprinting towards me, trying to steal the ball. I am having to think quick! I nukle the ball between my feet a couple times to buy some time. Then I am hitting a quick pass over to our star striker named Isabel.Isabel is taking a couple of touches to settle the ball down. She is such an incredible player. She pumps her arms back and rips a rocket shot towards the goal! But oh no, the goalie gets ahand on it and punches it over the crossbar. That was such a close chance!We line up to take the corner kick. Emma, our left midfielder, places the ball down and takes a few steps back. She is taking a few deep breaths to stay calm and focused. Emma is licking her lips, then starts her approach towards the ball. She plants her left foot and rips a wicked bending ball into the box with her right foot!I am making a near post run, trying to get position on my marker. The ball is whipping in with amazing pace! It is dipping right towards my head. I am leaping up and snapping my neck to power the ball towards frame with my forehead. Boom! I am scoring with a perfectly placed header into the left side netting. The goalkeeper had no chance on that one.The Red Rockets are going absolutely wild, mobbing me in celebration. We are looking so hyped and energized after that huge goal. It is giving us a 1-0 lead late in the second half. But we need to stay focused because there is still time left on the clock.The Blue Bombers are quickly restarting play from the center circle. They are pushing numbers forward now, frantically trying to find an equalizing goal. Our defenders are being forced to drop really deep to deal with the onslaught of pressure.Jacob, our center back, is screaming out directions and organizing our defensive shape. "Mark up tighter!" "Clear it!" he keeps yelling. He is such a great leader and general for our team.With only minutes remaining, the Blue Bombers are laying an all-out attack. They are flinging long throw-ins, corner kicks, and shots from distance at our goal mouth. Our keeper Aiden is being forced to make some really tough reaction saves to preserve our slim lead.Every time Aiden makes a stop or catches the ball, we are counter-attacking quickly on the other end. Jake, Isabel and I are combining with quick one-two passing to try and relieve pressure. One time Isabel is splitting the defense but gets taken down with a hard sliding challenge from behind. No foul is called though and play continues.The final whistle is finally sounding after what feels like an eternity of defending our lead. We are exploding off the field in raucous celebration, jumping into a chaotic swarm of joy. In the midst of the mayhem, I am grabbing Jake and Isabel and squeezing them tight in a huge group hug. We did it! We held on to beat our bitter rivals in an absolute war of a soccer game.After the postgame handshake line, we are all walking back to the bench area absolutely drenched in sweat and grass stains.Our faces are covered in exhausted smiles though. Despite being dog tired, we are making sure to thank our parents for their endless support and cheering throughout the game. I give my mom a sweaty hug and she ruffles my sweaty hair, exclaiming how proud she is of my goal and our team's effort.In the parking lot afterwards, all of us teammates are chatting excitedly about the game's key moments. We are laughing and rehashing all the big plays, clutch saves, and dramatic moments. The bus ride back is filled with rambunctious singing and chanting to celebrate our massive victory over our rivals.As I am getting ready for bed that night, I take a moment to篇2I'm having so much fun playing soccer these days! Every afternoon after school, I'm rushing out to the field to meet up with my friends. We're all getting our soccer gear on - pulling up our shinguards, tying our cleats, and grabbing our water bottles. The coaches are setting up the cones and dragging out the ball bags.As soon as we're out on the field, we're starting with some stretches and warm-up exercises. I'm reaching down to touch mytoes, then swinging my arms across my body. My friend Michael is doing jumping jacks next to me, and Sophia is jogging in a circle around the group. The coaches are shouting out instructions, reminding us to keep our knees high and move our heads from side to side.Then we're splitting up into teams for the first drill. I'm dribbling the ball rapidly between the cones, keeping it close with lots of small touches. Anna is catching up behind me, trying to steal it away! I'm shielding the ball and turning my body to protect it. Whew, made it through that one!We're taking a water break now, gulping down our drinks and wiping sweat from our foreheads. The sun is beating down, and we're already getting hot and tired. But we're not stopping there!Next up is a passing exercise. I'm making a triangle with Jackie and Marcus. We're knocking the ball crisply between each other with the insides of our feet. "That's it, nice one-two passes!" the coach is yelling. I'm concentrating hard, striking through the middle and putting some spin on it.Uh-oh, the ball is skipping away from Marcus. He's sprinting after it as I'm waving for him to hurry back. We're resetting and going again, trying to keep our triangle tighter this time.The final drill is my favorite - we're playing small-sided games on half the field. The intensity is ramping up as we're fighting for every loose ball. I'm jockeying for position, checking over my shoulders, and looking for openings to receive a pass. Yes! Ethan is slipping me the ball behind the defenders. I'm taking a touch to settle it, picking up my head, and slotting it into the side netting. "Goal!" I'm shouting and wheeling away in celebration while my teammates chase after me.We're hooting and hollering after each score, with lots of high-fives and fist bumps all around. The games are ending too soon - I wish we could keep on playing!As we're walking off the field, we're grabbing our bags and chugging down more water. I'm dripping with sweat and my legs are feeling heavy, but I've got a huge smile on my face. I can't wait to come back tomorrow and do it all over again. Playing soccer with my friends is one of the best parts of my day. I'm already counting down the hours until practice!篇3I Am Kicking the Soccer BallI am playing soccer right now on the field behind my school. The bright green grass feels soft under my feet as I am runningback and forth. The warm sun is shining down, making me sweat a little bit. My friend Jacob is passing the ball over to me. I am trapping it with the inside of my foot to stop it. Now I am dribbling the soccer ball, weaving between defenders.My teammates Michael and Emma are calling for the ball. "Pass it over here!" Emma is yelling, waving her arms. But the other team's players Sara and Aiden are marking them closely, sticking right by their sides. I cannot risk passing to them or the ball might get stolen. Instead, I am cutting towards the goal, faking left and then going right to get around one of the defenders.Aiden is sliding to try and poke the ball away from me, but I am nutmegging him, pushing the ball through his legs! Now there is only the goalie left to beat. His name is Ryan and he is dancing back and forth, trying to look big and block my angle to the goal. I am taking a few more touches to set myself up for the perfect shot.Ryan is leaning to his left, so I am firing the ball across to the right side netting. Yes! It is sailing past his outstretched hands into the back of the net! Gooooaaaaal! I am throwing my arms up into the air and cheering. My teammates are rushing over tocelebrate with me, jumping up and down happily. We are all smiles and high-fives.But the game is not over yet. The other team is putting the ball back into play, trying to counter-attack quickly. Luckily, our defender John is heading the ball out of harm's way, up the field towards me. I am running onto it and turning up the field again. Sara is chasing after me but I am accelerating away from her, sprinting as fast as I can.Up ahead, Jacob is making a run down the left side. I am picking my head up and playing a nice through ball into the space behind the defense for him to run onto. He is taking a couple of touches to settle it and then is blasting a shot on target. But the goalie Ryan is parrying it out for a corner kick.We are setting up for the corner, with Michael as the taker. He is whipping the ball in with lots of pace and bend. It is clearing everyone in the box and curling towards the back post! I am making a late run onto it and throwing my body into the air, getting my head to the ball. I am powering it down and across the face of the goal mouth. Emma is crashing in and getting a foot to it at the last second to poke it over the line! Another goal for our team!I am so tired after scoring and assisting on those last couple of plays. I am putting my hands on my knees, panting heavily to catch my breath. The coach is calling for a water break, sensing our fatigue. We are jogging over to grab some drinks and oranges. The cool water feels so refreshing sliding down my parched throat. The juicy orange slices are reviving me a bit too.Soon it is time to get back out on the field for the second half though. The coach is making some changes, subbing a couple of players on and off. We are going over our tactics and roles again quickly. I am being told to stay higher up the pitch this half, trying to stretch their backline and create space for others to attack into.The whistle blows and we are kicking off again. John is launching a long ball forward over the top for me to run onto. I am leaving it to run across my body, then spinning off the defender's shoulder. Now I am taking a few touches to travel with the ball at my feet. Jacob is overlapping down the flank, so I am playing him in behind their defense.Jacob is cutting the ball back across the face of goal towards the penalty spot. Our teammate Anna is arriving late and blazing a one-time shot into the roof of the net! What a hit! We arejumping around again, bouncing with joy at scoring another beautiful team goal.The game is really opening up now, with both teams pouring numbers forward looking for more goals. It is end-to-end stuff, with chances coming at both ends. Ryan is making a terrific save to tip a long-range screamer over the bar for a corner kick. Then at the other end, Emma is slicing just wide of the far post after a scramble in their penalty box.With only a few minutes remaining, the coach is screaming for us to keep our focus and not give anything away late. We are trying to hold our lead and see out the win. Their forwards are throwing men forward desperately but our defense is holding firm, clearing any danger. At last, the final whistle is blowing and we have won the game!What a battle it was! I am completely exhausted but over the moon with happiness at our victory. We are shaking hands with the opponents to show good sportsmanship. Then we are coming together in a huddle, putting our arms around each other and savoring the great篇4I am kicking the soccer ball across the field. My teammates are running and chasing after it. The sun is shining brightly overhead as we are playing our favorite game. Miguel is dribbling the ball down the left side. He is avoiding the other team's players. Samantha is calling for him to pass it over to her. She is wide open near the goal.Miguel kicks it hard and Samantha is receiving the perfect pass. She is taking a big wind-up. The goalie is preparing to block her shot. Samantha is shooting with all her might. The ball is soaring through the air. It is flying just over the goalie's outstretched hands! Gooooaaaaalllll! We are all cheering loudly. Samantha is doing her famous dance she always does after scoring.Now it is their turn to kick off. Michael is lining up to boot the ball. He is taking a few steps back to get a running start. Michael is kicking it with a huge kick. The ball is arching high into the air. I am tracking it with my eyes, watching it come towards me. It is getting closer and closer. I am jumping up to head it over to Anna. She is streaking down the field. Anna is receiving my perfect header pass. She is dribbling the ball rapidly.Two defenders are converging on her. Anna is seeing an opening and shooting towards the goal. The ball is clanging offthe post! No! So close! Joseph is there to collect the rebound though. He is passing it across to me. I am shooting as the goalie is diving. Yes! We are scoring again! What a game this is!The score is 2-1 now with us in the lead. Jordan is taking the kick off for them. He is lofting a high arcing ball toward their striker. Francesca is outracing our defenders to get to it. She is putting her head down and sprinting as fast as she can. Francesca is making a move around John. He is sticking his leg out to try and poke the ball away. Francesca is dribbling around him though. She is bearing down on our goal. Our goalie Marcus is coming out to cut down the angle. Francesca is winding up for a huge shot. She is blasting it towards the upper corner! Marcus is leaping up with his arms fully extended. He is just getting a hand on it to deflect it over the net! What a save! We are ecstatic and giving him high-fives.The game is really heating up now with both teams searching for more goals. We are continuing to counter-attack quickly after getting possession. Anna is leading the charge once again. She is weaving in and out between their players. David is open on the left side. Anna is slotting a beautiful through ball into his path. David is collecting it and taking it down the wing.He is sending a cross into the middle. I am there to get a head on it. My header is just sailing wide of the post though, so close!Their goalie is eating the ball and holding onto possession. He is looking to distribute it out quickly. Marcus is calling for him to play it long. Their goalie is booting a high, arcing ball towards their striker Ethan. John and Rebecca are challenging for it in the air. John is getting a head on it to flick it on over to me. I am taking a touch to settle it. Then I am turning and taking off towards their goal.Ethan is tracking back to try and steal it from me. I am dribbling with speed, holding him off. He is reaching in trying to poke it away. I am cutting hard to the right to shake him off. I am lining up a shot from the top of the box. Their keeper is cheating over in anticipation of my shot. I am drilling it towards the far post! He is diving but not getting there in time. Gooooaaalllll! We are jumping up and down, so excited to finally get another goal.The score is 3-1 to us now with only a few minutes remaining. We are playing keep away, maintaining possession to run out the clock. Sofia is dribbling in little circles around their players. She is drawing multiple defenders towards her. Then Sofia is slipping a clever pass through to David. He is taking a shot from distance.Their keeper is parrying it away though for a corner kick. Miguel is taking the corner for us. He is sending an in-swinging ball towards the middle of the box. I am rising up to meet it. My header is just skimming off the crossbar! So close again! We are still holding the 3-1 lead though as the final whistle blows. What an awesome, hard-fought game! We are all hugging and celebrating our victory together.篇5I am kicking the soccer ball across the field. My feet are running quickly across the grass. The ball is moving in front of me as I dribble it down the field. My teammate Tommy is waving his arms, calling for me to pass it to him.I look up and see two defenders are closing in on me. I makea quick move to my left to get around one of them. The other defender is coming straight at me now. I have to pass the ball soon before he steals it from me.I wind up my leg and kick the ball hard, sending it soaring through the air. Tommy is jumping up for the pass. He heads the ball down towards the goal. Our striker Joey is sprinting towards the net. He traps the ball with his foot and then blasts it past thegoalie into the corner of the net. Gooooaaal! We are all cheering and giving each other high fives.The other team kicks off again after our celebration. The game is tied 1-1 late in the second half. We have to score another goal to win this one. The action is going back and forth across the middle of the field for a few minutes. Both teams are battling hard for control.My teammate Chloe gets the ball out wide on the wing. I am making a run towards the corner, waving my hands for her to send me a cross. Chloe spots me and launches a beautiful bending cross into the box. I jump up into the air and head the ball on goal. The keeper dives but can't reach it! Another goal for our team! We are pumped up, slapping hands and hugging each other.There are just a few minutes left now. The other team is pushing everyone forward, desperately trying to tie it up. We drop extra players into our defensive third to protect the lead. They are firing shots from all angles, but our goalie is being a brick wall. She tips one shot over the bar, then smothers a low hard shot moments later.The final whistle blows and we erupt in cheers! What a game that was! The whole team comes together in a group hug,jumping up and down celebrating our hard-fought 2-1 victory. Our parents are clapping and yelling congratulations from the sidelines.As we sit catching our breath after the game, I can't stop smiling. Playing soccer is just the best feeling in the world. The running, the scoring, the competitiveness, the teamwork, the excitement of the ups and downs of the game. I can't get enough of it. I am already counting down the days until our next game!篇6I Am Playing SoccerI am running across the big grassy field, dribbling the black and white soccer ball with my feet. The bright sun is shining down on me and my friends as we are chasing the ball back and forth. I can hear Coach Mike's whistle blowing as he is watching us play from the sidelines.My teammate Sammy is passing the ball over to me. I am trapping it with the inside of my foot to get it under control. Two opponents from the red team are closing in on me quickly. I am faking one way, then quickly cutting the other direction to get around them. They are falling for my move and I am breaking free down the sideline.As I am dribbling closer to the goal, the goalie is coming off her line to cut down the angle. I am picking my head up to look for my friends making runs into the box. Emily is waving her hands, calling for the pass. I am taking a touch to settle the ball and then ripping a cross over to her. She is jumping up and heading the ball down towards the ground. The ball is bouncing up perfectly for her to smash a shot into the side netting! Gooooaaaaalllll! We are going wild, celebrating our score.The game is restarting with the red team putting the ball back into play. They are trying to play quickly to catch us off guard. Their big striker is making a run down the middle of the field with the ball. My teammate Aiden is sprinting back on defense to pressure him. He is staying light on his feet, getting low in his defensive stance. The striker is trying to blow past Aiden, but Aiden is mirroring him step for step. Just when the striker winds up fora shot, Aiden is poking the ball free with a perfectly timed poke check! What a tackle! I am jumping up and down on the sideline, cheering for my friend's great defensive play.The referee's whistle is blowing again as he calls for a water break with ten minutes left in the half. We are all walking over to the benches, grabbing our water bottles. Coach is giving usinstructions, but I am having a hard time listening because I am still catching my breath. He keeps reminding us to make the easy pass and maintain our shape defensively.The whistle is blowing again to restart play and we are rushing back onto the field. Sarah is dropping the ball back to Marcus who is our defensive center mid. He is calmly settling the ball and looking to spray the ball out wide to the wingers. He spots an opening and plays a nice through ball in between the red team's defense. I am running onto the pass and taking a touch to bring it across my body. The defenders are recovering quickly, so I am slipping a pass over to Connor who is makingadiagonal run into the box. Connor is letting the ball run across his bodyand then ripping a shot far post! The goalie is diving but she can't get across in time as the ballrips into the side netting! We are mobbing Connor to celebrate another goal!With only a few minutes remaining, the red team is throwing everyone forward looking for a late goal. They are launching long balls from the back towards our penalty box. I am dropping into the box to help out on defense. One of their big strikers is getting on the end of a cross but he is heading it just wide of the post. Phew, that was a close call! My heart is racing as time is expiring in the game. Finally, the referee's whistle blows threetimes to signal the end of the match. We all collapse to the ground exhausted but thrilled with our victory! We are lining up to shake hands with the opponents and congratulating each other on a hard-fought game.As we are walking off the field, I can see my mom and dad cheering and waving from the sidelines. They are so proud of me and my teammates for the effort we showed out there today. We are rounding up at the bench area with Coach Mike as he congratulates us on the big win. He reminds us to keep working hard at practice as we have another game next weekend. I can't wait to lace up my cleats and get back out on the pitch! Playing soccer is so much fun and I am having a blast with my friends!。

英语男女情感的词组1. Falling in Love - "Head over heels", "Cupid's arrow", "Swept off my feet"2. Expressing Affection - "Love you to the moon and back", "Be still my beating heart", "My better half"3. Romantic Gestures - "Wine and dine", "Serenade", "Write a love letter"4. Deep Connection - "Soulmate", "Kindred spirit", "Twin flame"5. Companionship - "Life partner", "Side by side", "Together through thick and thin"6. Courtship - "Charmed by", "Wooing", "Pursuit of love"7. Admiration - "Smitten", "Infatuated", "Enamored"8. Relationship Milestones - "Love at first sight", "Engaged", "Tying the knot"9. Passion - "Fiery romance", "Passionate embrace", "Burning desire"10. Support in Love - "Pillar of support", "In sickness andin health", "Stand by your side"11. Love's Challenges - "Trials of love", "Love conquers all", "Weather the storm"12. Reconciliation - "Make up", "Patch things up", "Rekindle the flame"13. Unrequited Love - "One-sided love", "Heartbroken", "Love from afar"14. Long-Distance Love - "Absence makes the heart grow fonder", "Digital romance", "Letters across the sea"15. Enduring Love - "Eternal love", "Till death do us part","Love never dies"16. Romantic Settings - "Candlelit dinner", "Romantic getaway", "Stroll on the beach"17. Love's Promises - "Promise to love", "Vows", "Pledging forever"18. Love's Intensity - "Madly in love", "Love at its peak", "Intense affection"19. Love's Sweetness - "Sugar and spice", "Sweetheart", "Honey"20. Love's Devotion - "Dedicated to you", "Devoted partner", "Unwavering love"These phrases can be used to express a range of emotions and stages in a romantic relationship, from the initial spark of attraction to the deep bonds of commitment and companionship.。