Searchable Symmetric Encryption
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SearchableSymmetricEncryption:
ImprovedDefinitionsandEfficientConstructions∗
RezaCurtmola†
NJITJuanGaray‡
AT&TLabs–ResearchSenyKamara§
MicrosoftResearchRafailOstrovsky¶
UCLA
Abstract
Searchablesymmetricencryption(SSE)allowsapartytooutsourcethestorageofhisdatatoanotherpartyinaprivatemanner,whilemaintainingtheabilitytoselectivelysearchoverit.Thisproblemhasbeenthefocusofactiveresearchandseveralsecuritydefinitionsandconstructionshavebeenproposed.Inthispaperwebeginbyreviewingexistingnotionsofsecurityandproposenewandstrongersecuritydefinitions.Wethenpresenttwoconstructionsthatweshowsecureunderournewdefinitions.Interestingly,inadditiontosatisfyingstrongersecurityguarantees,ourconstructionsaremoreefficientthanallpreviousconstructions.Further,priorworkonSSEonlyconsideredthesettingwhereonlytheownerofthedataiscapableofsubmittingsearchqueries.Weconsiderthenaturalextensionwhereanarbitrarygroupofpartiesotherthantheownercansubmitsearchqueries.WeformallydefineSSEinthismulti-usersetting,andpresentanefficientconstruction.
1Introduction
Private-keystorageoutsourcing[30,4,33]allowsclientswitheitherlimitedresourcesorlimitedexper-
tisetostoreanddistributelargeamountsofsymmetricallyencrypteddataatlowcost.Sinceregular
private-keyencryptionpreventsonefromsearchingoverencrypteddata,clientsalsolosetheability
toselectivelyretrievesegmentsoftheirdata.Toaddressthis,severaltechniqueshavebeenproposed
forprovisioningsymmetricencryptionwithsearchcapabilities[40,23,10,18];theresultingconstruct
istypicallycalledsearchableencryption.Theareaofsearchableencryptionhasbeenidentifiedby
DARPAasoneofthetechnicaladvancesthatcanbeusedtobalancetheneedforbothprivacyand
nationalsecurityininformationaggregationsystems[1].
Oneapproachtoprovisioningsymmetricencryptionwithsearchcapabilitiesiswithaso-called
secureindex[23].Anindexisadatastructurethatstoresdocumentcollectionswhilesupporting
efficientkeywordsearch,i.e.,givenakeyword,theindexreturnsapointertothedocumentsthat
containit.Informally,anindexis“secure”ifthesearchoperationforakeywordwcanonlybe
performedbyusersthatpossessa“trapdoor”forwandifthetrapdoorcanonlybegeneratedwith
asecretkey.Withoutknowledgeoftrapdoors,theindexleaksnoinformationaboutitscontents.
AsshownbyGohin[23],onecanbuildasymmetricsearchableencryptionschemefromasecure
∗Apreliminaryversionofthisarticleappearedinthe13thACMConferenceonComputerandCommunicationsSecurity(CCS’06)[20].†crix@njit.edu.WorkdoneinpartwhileatBellLabsandJohnsHopkinsUniversity.‡garay@research.att.com.WorkdoneinpartwhileatBellLabs.§senyk@microsoft.com.WorkdoneinpartwhileatJohnsHopkinsUniversity.¶rafail@cs.ucla.edu.
1indexasfollows:theclientindexesandencryptsitsdocumentcollectionandsendsthesecureindex
togetherwiththeencrypteddatatotheserver.Tosearchforakeywordw,theclientgeneratesand
sendsatrapdoorforwwhichtheserverusestorunthesearchoperationandrecoverpointerstothe
appropriate(encrypted)documents.
Symmetricsearchableencryptioncanbeachievedinitsfullgeneralityandwithoptimalsecurity
usingtheworkofOstrovskyandGoldreichonobliviousRAMs[35,25].Moreprecisely,usingthese
techniquesanytypeofsearchquerycanbeachieved(e.g.,conjunctionsordisjunctionsofkeywords)
withoutleakinganyinformationtotheserver,noteventhe“accesspattern”(i.e.,whichdocuments
containthekeyword).Thisstrongprivacyguarantee,however,comesatthecostofalogarithmic(in
thenumberofdocuments)numberofroundsofinteractionforeachreadandwrite.Inthesamepaper,
theauthorsshowa2-roundsolution,butwithconsiderablylargersquare-rootoverhead.Therefore,
thepreviouslymentionedworkonsearchableencryption[40,23,10,18]triestoachievemoreefficient
solutions(typicallyinoneortworounds)byweakeningtheprivacyguarantees.
1.1Ourcontributions
Wenowgiveanoverviewofthecontributionsofthiswork.
Revisitingpreviousdefinitions.Wereviewexistingsecuritydefinitionsforsecureindexes,includ-
ingindistinguishabilityagainstchosen-keywordattacks(IND2-CKA)[23]andthesimulation-based
definitionin[18],andhighlightsomeoftheirlimitations.Specifically,werecallthatIND2-CKAdoes
notguaranteetheprivacyofuserqueries(andisthereforenotanadequatenotionofsecurityfor
constructingSSEschemes)andthenhighlight(andfix)technicalissueswiththesimulation-based
definitionof[18].Weaddressboththeseissuesbyproposingnewgame-basedandsimulation-based
definitionsthatprovidesecurityforbothindexesandtrapdoors.
Newdefinitions.WeintroducenewadversarialmodelsforSSE.Thefirst,whichwerefertoasnon-
adaptive,onlyconsidersadversariesthatmaketheirsearchquerieswithouttakingintoaccountthe
trapdoorsandsearchoutcomesofprevioussearches.Thesecond—adaptive—considersadversaries
thatchoosetheirqueriesasafunctionofpreviouslyobtainedtrapdoorsandsearchoutcomes.All
previousworkonSSE(withtheexceptionofobliviousRAMs)fallswithinthenon-adaptivesetting.
Theimplicationisthat,contrarytothenaturaluseofsearchableencryptiondescribedin[40,23,18],
thesedefinitionsonlyguaranteesecurityforusersthatperformalltheirsearchesatonce.Weaddress
thisbyintroducinggame-basedandsimulation-baseddefinitionsintheadaptivesetting.
Newconstructions.Wepresenttwoconstructionswhichweprovesecureunderournewdefinitions.
Ourfirstschemeisonlysecureinthenon-adaptivesetting,butisthemostefficientSSEconstruction
todate.Infact,itachievessearchesinonecommunicationround,requiresanamountofworkfrom
theserverthatislinearinthenumberofdocumentsthatcontainthekeyword(whichisoptimal),
requiresconstantstorageontheclient,andlinear(inthesizeofthedocumentcollection)storageon
theserver.Whiletheconstructionin[23]alsoperformssearchesinoneround,itcaninducefalse
positives,whichisnotthecaseforourconstruction.Additionally,alltheconstructionsin[23,18]
requiretheservertoperformanamountofworkthatislinearinthetotalnumberofdocumentsin
thecollection.
Oursecondconstructionissecureagainstanadaptiveadversary,butatthepriceofrequiring
ahighercommunicationoverheadperqueryandmorestorageattheserver(comparablewiththe
storagerequiredin[23]).Whileouradaptiveschemeisconceptuallysimple,wenotethatconstructing
efficientandprovablysecureadaptiveSSEschemesisanon-trivialtask.Themainchallengeliesin
provingsuchconstructionssecureinthesimulationparadigm,sincethesimulatorrequirestheability
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